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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Civil Society has been receiving great attention in the world literature in recent decades. 
Similarly, the academia and the media have shown interest in Civil Society in Turkey 
and its actors, “Civil Society Organizations (CSOs),” especially with the rising impact 
of the EU accession process. The transformation of civil society and its organizations in 
Turkey has not been enabled solely through the impact of the EU.  Nevertheless, it 
would not be incorrect to say that the EU is the strongest variable influencing both this 
transformation and the rise of several other active and efficacious actors.  Specifically 
after the Helsinki Summit 1999, which gave Turkey candidacy status, governments 
have been eager to conform to EU demands. Accordingly, legislative reform packages 
involving amendments concerning civil society, e.g., the New Associations Law and the 
New Civil Code have emerged. There is no EU acquis communautaire in civil society 
area but rather member states have the full competence to organize their related 
legislation. Additionally, in the EU level, there is unbinding legislation pertaining to and 
intensive interactions with the CSOs. The EU helps with funding and getting CSOs 
involved in the decision-making processes, as well. Turkish CSOs benefit from EU 
funds, receive support and exercise bilateral relations, even at not the level desired, with 
many EU institutions. Yet, it should be born in mind that the transformation of civil 
society is not only political or economic, but also cultural and social. Thus, it takes time 
for it to be internalized by the public, which actually comes to constitute civil society 
itself. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
Son yıllarda, sivil toplum dünya literatüründe, büyük bir ilgi çekmekte. Benzer bir 
şekilde akademik dünya ve medya da Türkiye’de sivil topluma ve onun aktörleri “Sivil 
Toplum Kuruluşlarına” (STK’lar), özellikle AB katılım sürecinin de artan etkisiyle 
beraber, ilgi göstermektedir. Türkiye’de sivil toplumun ve kuruluşlarının dönüşümü 
sadece AB etkisiyle gerçekleşmemiştir. Bununla beraber, AB’nin bu dönüşüme ve diğer 
çeşitli aktif ve etkili aktörlerin ortaya çıkmasına etki eden en güçlü değişken olduğunu 
söylemek yanlış olmaz. Özellikle, Türkiye’ye adaylık statüsü veren Helsinki 
Zirvesi’nden sonra (1999), hükümetler AB’nin taleplerine uyma konusunda daha istekli 
oldular. Buna bağlı olarak, sivil toplumu da ilgilendiren kanun değişikliklerini içeren 
hukuki reform paketleri ortaya çıktı; örneğin Yeni Dernekler Yasası ve Yeni Medeni 
Kanun. Sivil toplum alanında AB müktesabatı yok; bunun yerine, üye devletler ilgili 
mevzuatlarını düzenlemede tam yetkiye sahipler. Buna ilaveten, AB düzeyinde, 
bağlayıcı olmayan mevzuat ve STK’larla yoğun etkileşim var. AB, fonlar ve STK’ların 
karar mekanizmaları süreçlerine katılmaları konusunda da yardımcı oluyor. Türk 
STK’ları AB fonlarından yararlanıyor, destek alıyor ve AB kuruluşlarıyla, her ne kadar 
 x
istenilen düzeyde olmasa da, karşılıklı ilişkilerde bulunuyor. Sivil toplumun 
dönüşümünün sadece politik veya ekonomik değil, aynı zamanda kültürel ve toplumsal 
da olduğu unutulmamalıdır. Bu nedenle, sivil toplumun kendisini oluşturan halk 
tarafından bu dönüşümün özümsenmesi zaman alır.    
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1. Purpose and the Scope of the Study 
   
This study intends to conduct a comprehensive analysis of Turkish Civil Society and its 
organizations within the context of the impact of the Turkey-European Union (EU) process. 
While civil society in Turkey has received increased attention in recent years, it is a relatively 
new area of research, where the volume of research has been relatively low. Studies done 
either lack an EU component or only provide a value-based overview of the impact of the EU. 
What this means is that the scholars working in the area mostly examine “the role of civil 
society within the context of Europeanization.”1 Their studies have focused more on the 
changing structures of values, identity and culture. Moreover, the relationship between the EU 
institutions and the civil society organizations (CSOs) in the EU is not examined. The studies 
have restricted themselves to the Turkish case. This study, on the other hand, attempts to take 
a deductive approach in examining the impact of EU, putting priority on the EU-CSO 
relationship and then linking it to Turkish CSOs. The areas where Turkish CSOs and EU 
institutions intersect in terms of co-operation and assistance will be evaluated in detail.  
Turkish CSOs operating in Brussels and major EU CSOs having relations with Turkey will be 
elaborated as well. Before emphasizing these points, the history of civil society in Turkey 
                                                 
1 Presentation by Ahmet İçduygu (together with Ayhan Kaya); “Civil Society and 
Turkey’s Europeanization Process: Towards a Differentiated Analysis,” in Symposium 
on Europeanization and Transformation: Turkey in the Post-Helsinki Era, 2-3 
December 2005, Koç University, Istanbul 
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with a reference to late Ottoman Period will be given briefly in order to explain the relative 
weakness of the civil society in Turkey.  
 
The literature also points to the fact that studies focus only on one type of CSOs, such as 
business organizations. These studies lack a comprehensive view of civil society. Seeing this 
deficit, this study takes an integrative approach to CSOs, using the definition of the 
“European Economic and Social Committee” (EESC), which explains the civil society actors 
in the broadest terms possible. Thus, starting from that definition, the rest of the paper goes on 
to discuss CSOs more comprehensively.  
 
Though the history of EU-Turkey relations goes back to 1963, with the Ankara 
Agreement, one cannot say easily argue that the EU has had a major impact on Turkey or that 
it has had much of an enforcing role in the country. Its influence has been mostly financial or 
in the area of trade due to the periodic reduction of customs duties. These periods have been 
finalized with the Customs Union Agreement in 1995 (which came into force in 1996). We 
have to keep in mind that before the 1990s, there were no Maastricht or Copenhagen Criteria 
to be enforced within the candidate countries. Moreover, Turkey had not yet become a 
candidate country having the prospect of membership. Only with the Helsinki Summit in 
1999 was Turkey declared to be a candidate country for EU membership.  Since then, Turkey 
has been required to implement several criteria and to carry out particular reforms, which 
have resulted in nine reform packages passed by the Turkey Grand National Assembly 
(TGNA). These reforms, which have brought amendments to the existing laws, have changed 
the Civil Code and the Associations Law. The Law of Foundations, which has not yet been 
adopted due to presidential veto, is also under review. Turkey’s progress in terms of these 
reform packages is evaluated in the Regular Reports of the European Commission. Further 
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expected developments, including those in the area of civil society, are also included in the 
reports.  Giving Turkey candidacy status transformed the EU into a coercive power that laid 
down rules, under the name of “recommendations,” to be enforced by Turkey. This coercive 
role has been facilitated by the perceived importance of the Turkey-EU process, within which 
the prospect of Turkish membership had become clearer. The perceived credibility of the EU 
to fulfill its promises encouraged governments bound by EU demands to act. Last but not the 
least, the candidacy process gave Turkey the right to officially participate in several EU 
programmes and receive financial assistance, which the CSOs in Turkey enjoyed.  
 
Based on all the outcomes of the Helsinki Summit, the timeline taken by this paper for 
the interaction between the EU and civil society in Turkey is from 1999, when the Helsinki 
Summit was held, to 2007.  This paper does not intend to argue that the transformation of civil 
society and its organizations in Turkey has been enabled solely through the impact of the EU.  
Nevertheless, it would not be incorrect to say that EU has been the strongest variable 
contributing to both the given transformation and the rise of several other actors that have 
become active and acquired efficacy. Given the rising awareness in and legitimacy given to 
them by the Turkish public, along with their own belief in themselves, Turkish CSOs have 
started to advocate their own rights and ask for further reforms, in addition to those requested 
by the EU. Therefore, after getting the impetus from the EU, the process has become self-
sufficient and self-operating. This does not mean, however, that it has yet sufficiently 
developed or is not supported by the EU.    
 
After examining the EU’s impact on civil society and the developments occurring within 
it, this study also analyzes the strengths and the weaknesses of the CSOs in Turkey, 
emphasizing how they operate. In this part, statistical data obtained from several surveys 
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conducted of different institutions will be given to support the arguments. It should be pointed 
out, however, that no statistical survey was conducted specifically during the course of this 
study.  
 
As an intern at the European Parliament in Brussels, I conducted interviews in Turkey 
and Brussels with academicians, experts and other professionals working in EU institutions 
and Turkish associations and public institutions.  In addition to the studies found in the 
literature and the interviews, the seminars and meetings I attended and the media were used as 
resources.  Lastly, the past and current experiences of this researcher in CSOs since 2000, 
which is taken as fieldwork, will be used to support arguments and to conduct analyses. 
Inductive methodology will be used frequently in the study in order to make a connection 
between the EU and Turkey and to compare and contrast them vis-à-vis the points being 
made.    
 
 
2.  Research Questions 
 
This study intends to answer the following questions: 
 What is the legacy of civil society in EU Institutions? What  is the main legislation   
         (binding or unbinding) in the area? 
 
 Who are the main actors in the EU that have influence on civil society           
         Organizations? 
 
 What is the impact of the EU on civil society in Turkey and on the Turkish Civil  
         Society Organizations in the EU accession process? 
 
 What is the state of civil society organizations in Turkey?  
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3.  Definition 
 
Before starting to write my thesis, I conducted a comprehensive literature review and 
held interviews with several academicians regarding the definition of civil society and its 
actors. In defining the focus of my study, I had the most difficulty dealing with “civil society” 
due to the complexity of the concept and the lack of consensus on its definition. In the 
literature, not only is there no consensus on its definition but also with respect to the content, 
functions and even the names it is given. For instance, civil society actors are variously called 
“voluntary organizations,” “non-governmental organizations” (NGOs), or “third-sector 
actors.” The names given to them also provide a clue to the possible organization types that 
the scholar has in mind when referring to civil society. For example, when using the term 
“voluntary organization,” he may exclude organizations having obligatory membership such 
as chambers. Or when referring to them as “NGOs,” he excludes organizations that have an 
organic relationship with the state such as “Quangos” (Quasi-NGOs, which are widespread in 
UK, and Scandinavian countries, may act like sub-departments of the state). Therefore, this 
disagreement made it difficult to choose the sample organizations and CSO type in my study.  
 
The history of the debates on civil society goes back to Ancient Greece. What began 
with Aristotle is still being discussed today. Through out the centuries, notable contributions 
have been made, for example, by Cicero, Hegel, Marx, Hegel, Gramsci, Hobbes, Locke and 
Tocqueville. These debates have been an attempt to discover the most efficient model of 
government in which the actors of the system will find their roles. The three main actors - 
“the state,” “civil society” and “the market/economy” - have been defined vis-à-vis one 
another right from the beginning. For instance, while scholars like Aristotle and Cicero 
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defined the actors (which, at their time, included only the state and the civil society) as 
integrated (in Ancient Greek tradition, to be a member of civil society was to be a citizen – a 
member of the state2), others divided the actors – as in the case of liberal representative 
democratic models.3 Some see hierarchical order between the actors, such as Locke who 
emphasized the supremacy of the state. Others, on the other hand, for example, Marxists, 
argue that a system of classes exists. These debates foresee idealistic situations where the civil 
society and other actors are defined in terms of how they are supposed to be in the real world. 
While elaborating the debates, I have tried to keep in mind that I am writing this study taking 
into consideration the conditions of today’s world. Moreover, as I have desired to provide a 
definition in the broadest terms possible, so as to increase the comprehensiveness of the actors 
included and to examine the impact of EU, I found it most rational to use the definition of 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) to which the European Commission and 
other several institutions have referred. The excerpts have been taken from the Opinion of 
EESC : 
Civil society organizations can be defined in abstract terms as the sum of all 
organizational structures whose members have objectives and responsibilities 
that are of general interest and who also act as mediators between the public 
authorities and citizens. Their effectiveness is crucially dependent on the extent to 
which their players are prepared to help achieve consensus through public and 
democratic debate and to accept the outcome of a democratic policy-making 
process. 
Civil society organizations include: 
• so-called labor-market players, i.e., the social partners; 
 
                                                 
2 John Keane, “Despotism and Democracy: The Origins and the Development of the 
Distinction between Civil Society and the State 1750-1850,” in John Keane (ed.), Civil 
Society and the State: New European Perspectives, as cited by Sefa Şimşek, 1998. 
 
         3 For further information, see Gülgün Erdoğan Tosun, “Associative Democracy:  
         Would It Be a Means of Analyse to Reconstruct State-Civil Society Relations?,”  
         Periodical of Civil Society, No. 1, 2003   
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• organizations representing social and economic players, which are not 
social partners in the strict sense of the term; 
 
• NGOs (non-governmental organizations), which bring people together in a 
common cause, such as environmental organizations, human rights 
organizations, consumer associations, charitable organizations, educational 
and training organizations.; 
 
• CBOs (community-based organizations, i.e., organizations set up within 
society at grassroots level which pursue member-oriented objectives), e.g., 
youth organizations, family associations and all organizations through 
which citizens participate in local and municipal life; 
• Religious communities.4 
 
Based on this broad definition of the EESC, along with with the debates on civil society, 
the following figure, which I have created, provides a picture of the levels of civil society as 
used in the rest of the paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on “The role and contribution of civil 
society organizations in the building of Europe,” Brussels, 22 September 1999 
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                                                 Figure 1 
Hierarchical Diagram of Civil Society 
 
                                  
* The term “NGOs” is used in its representative sense since it is commonly used. Unions, 
interest groups, lobby groups, and else organizations are also included in the outer field of the 
circle in the chart. 
 
 
 
 
 CIVIL SOCIETY 
   CSOs  
NGOs* 
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II. HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY 
 
In order to find a phenomena’s origin, we review the past in phases. Every phase 
we reach takes us to another one. One similar to our subject also exists in 
previous phases. Thus, shifting from phenomena to phenomena, by tracing the 
commonalities rather than the differences, we may go back to the beginning of 
history. In this context, there is nothing new in the world. But, on the other side, 
we know that there is something new. History is full of both continuities and 
novelties. General conditions modify the old, known phenomena in different 
forms.5 
 
The point to be made here is that the concepts used in the paper have both continuity 
and evolutionary characteristics over time. Even if other terms are used or they exist in 
different contexts, the phenomena themselves are similar. Based on this argument, I will make 
reference to the late Ottoman period in the latter pages to explain contemporary civil society 
in Turkey. 
 
When examining the rise of civil society in the contemporary world, it can be seen that 
some scholars view it as a western concept, which requires the existence of conditions similar 
to those in the West in order to occur. Gellner argues that in Islamist and Marxist societies, 
civil society (organizations) cannot occur.6 Mardin7 indicates the lack of 
intermediate/secondary structures and absence of self-governing towns and several conditions 
                                                 
5 Murat Belge, “Civil Society Organizations,” in Ulaş Taciser (ed), Hello Civil Society, 
Helsinki Citizens Assembly, 1997. 
 
6 Bahattin Akşit, “Compromising Thought in Civil Society Should Extend,” Journal of 
Civil Society, n.1, 2003   
 
7 Şerif Mardin, “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, vol. 12, 1969 
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in the Ottoman Empire and “refers to civil society as a western dream.”8 Other scholars argue 
that liberalism, individualism, industrial revolution and other like movements did not occur as 
in its Western pattern, but rather in a more community-based system that creates widespread 
solidarity within the public.     
 
I refer to the Ottoman period because of the legacy it has left the Turkish Republic in 
terms of values, traditions and governing structures. I argue that there were early forms of 
civil society and its organizations in the Ottoman period though they were different from their 
Western patterns and the definition and functions of today’s world.  
 
In order to go into the origins of civil society in the Ottoman period, we have to examine 
the social, economic and state system of the time. 
During Ottoman times, there was a large artisan and merchant class, with private 
enterprise emerging in the 19th century mostly under the control of the minorities.9 Economic 
life was organized as a redistributive system by a patrimonial state. The patrimonial system 
excluded the rights and immunities enjoyed by local communities in feudal arrangement. In 
this context, it can be said that although the Ottoman system kept civil society from 
flourishing, there were old types of foundations that carried out some of the functions 
performed by civil society today. The history of the origins of Turkish foundations has a long 
                                                 
8 Tim Niblock, “Civil Society in the Middle East” in Youssef  M. Choueiri (ed) A 
Companion to the History of the Middle East,  p. 489, Blackwell, 2005 
9 Interview with William Hale, Sabancı University 
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history going back to before 1280 BC (Türk Eti Vakfiyesi).10 Both in the Seljuk and Ottoman 
periods, over the centuries, we see that “foundations shared responsibility with the central 
Ottoman administration for such important services as education, health, religion, 
construction of roads, bridges, foundations, canals, palaces, public baths, inns, dikes and 
monuments.”11 Not only did they facilitate several public services but they also administered 
property holdings (the majority of Ottoman Istanbul property was administered by the 
foundations).12 With some of their tasks, one can argue they were not only part of civil society 
but also early examples of NGOs. But this argument does not mean that these associations 
were autonomous from the state or had a structure in the sense we have today. There were 
also akhi (ahi) and the guilds that "filled a vacuum in society, managing property, providing 
social solidarity."13 Each profession was organized in a guild (lonca), which acted like 
modern-day CSOs; we can even liken them to contemporary syndicates or labor unions.  
 
Due to its continuation in the Turkish Republic, examining the patrimonial tradition 
of the Empire would be useful. 
 
The Ottoman administration was not exactly an alien bureaucracy imposed upon 
society; it ruled more by reciprocal ties of patronage than by direct force - in fact, 
such was the nature of the Sultan's power that the popular Ottoman expression 
described it as no different as the kind of authority exercised by fathers over their 
sons. In folklore, Devlet Baba meant "Papa State.” But in the Ottoman Empire, 
social relationships and institutions were sustained by the direction imparted by 
                                                 
10 Davut Aydın, “Turkey,” in Foundations in Europe: Society Management and Law, 
S.A, V.T.&W.P. (eds), p. 260, CAF, 2001 
11 Üstün Ergüder, “Philanthropic Support for Policy Research: The Case of the Turkish 
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)” – Draft, 1999 
12 Davut Aydın, 2001 
13 Karen Fogg, "The Role and the Importance of the Foundations and Associations in the 
Process of European Integration," in Foundations and Associations in Turkey, Third 
Sector Foundation of Turkey, 2000 
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the state. It was political authority which held together and defined the limits of 
society as a whole. Political authority penetrated the social sphere of life in such 
a way that society was subsumed under the state, and economic life was closely 
supervised by the ruler.14 
 
Many scholars argue that this system portrayed by Sunar is strong and patrimonial and is 
thought to be the reason why civil society could not develop sufficiently in previous centuries. 
But Kalaycioglu has another view with regards to the continuation and impact of this structure 
vis-à-vis the Turkish state, arguing that “it is better to define the state as coercive (ceberrut)15 
and even arbitrary, rather than strong.”16 He maintains that it is not the strength but rather the 
relative weakness of the state that hinders civil society. This weakness results in a deficiency 
of the regulatory, extractive and distributive capabilities of the state, which renders the state 
elite (the “center”) somewhat vulnerable and fearful of the dissatisfaction of the masses (the 
“periphery”). There is also a relatively long history of mutual suspicion between the Centre 
and Periphery in Turkey, which reinforces the sense of vulnerability and insecurity felt by the 
political elite. Hence, they try to use executive power in a relatively arbitrary manner to 
establish a punitive capacity to put down any form of potential or actual challenge to their 
style of rule.17   
 
                                                 
14 İlkay Sunar; "Populism and Patronage: The Democrat Party and Its Legacy in Turkey, 
in State, Society and Democracy in Turkey, pp 1-39; Bahçeşehir University Publication, 
2004. 
 
15 Binnaz Toprak, “Civil Society in Turkey,” in Civil Society in the Middle East, ed., 
A.R. Norton, p.89 
 
16 Ersin Kalaycioglu, “Civil Society in Turkey: Continuity or Change?,” in Turkish 
Transformation: New Century New Challenges, W. Beeley, Brian (ed), p.71, 2002 
 
17 Ibid 
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The Ottoman Empire had a "compartmentalized society."18 Although the institutions we 
have mentioned did not have political autonomy, they were relatively flexible. They enjoyed 
some kind of relative autonomy from the state even if not an absolute one; they were 
systematized and integrated into several parts of society. The tradition of bureaucratic rule 
was so powerful, continuing in the Turkish Republic, especially during the one-party period, 
that it controlled all types of civil society.19  
 
With the advent of the Turkish Republic, the understanding of civil society acquired new 
dimensions. 
 
Civil Society and NGOs begin to rise in Turkey as a consequence of the transition to a 
multiparty system: This was a major step towards democratization, which affected civil 
society as well. However, "democratization in Turkey occurred after bureaucratization of the 
state but before the industrialization of society. Thus, when the Democrat Party emerged as a 
part of democratization process, what it confronted was a sharp incongruence between state 
and society."20 The 1938 Law of Associations enacted during the period of Democrat Party 
rule resulted in the number of associations multiplying almost eight times (exceeding 17,000) 
by 1960.21 
  
                                                 
18 Ibid 
 
19 Ibid 
 
20 Sunar, 2004. 
 
21 Ergun Özbudun; Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic 
Consolidation, p. 129, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000 
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 The transition of political culture, rising education and belief in democracy22  have led to 
people in society to become more conscious of their rights, capacities and roles. Hence, 
citizens became interested in advocating their rights on their own.  
 
 The process of globalization, which has extended the private sector, has also resulted in 
the extension of civil society. The state started to privatize itself and leave the economic area. 
Firms filling the gap, started to realize that their own activities have certain negative impacts 
on the society. With a new understanding of "social responsibility," they started to help civil 
society in some ways. Moreover, globalization has the other civil movements in the world, 
such as environmentalism to have an impact on Turkey.23 The globalization movement has 
also been effective in extending liberalization and individualism movements, which are the 
basic values enabling civil society to flourish. Turkey met these concepts much later than EU 
countries did. Prior to this encounter, a society whose interests as a whole were more 
important than individual ones – a tradition coming down from the Ottoman era - was more 
important. With the advent of new movements, the individual started to realize that he was an 
actor distinct from the society as a whole – one that had rights that he could seek.  
  
Growth of the media has helped make civil society more transparent, accountable 
and visible.24  The effect of the media has increased greatly since the elimination of the 
law banning private radios and TV channels in 1993. The media (independent) is also 
important in the sense that they make government and the civil service both transparent 
                                                 
22 Lecture Notes, Göymen 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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and accountable to the citizen.25 
 
 Specific events like the earthquake of 1999 have also had an impact on civil 
society.26 Due to the inefficiency and late timing of the state forces in acting and 
managing the negative outcomes of the August 17, 1999 earthquake, citizens and 
organizations such as AKUT intervened with their own initiatives and capabilities, which 
led to intense debate afterwards. This has led to two novelties: Firstly, civil society began 
to act as a movement “from below,”27 with one of the tasks (to act on the natural 
disasters) previously held to be a responsibility of the state, being assumed by the 
citizens themselves, something which broke the traditional image of the state.   
 
One should also mention the effects of the constitutions on the development of civil 
society. The 1961 Constitution led to a pluralistic structure allowing for the expression of 
different voices and actors – a change that fostered the development of civil society 
organizations. According to the law, “everybody possesses the right to establish an 
association without obtaining prior permission. The right can be limited by law only in order 
to protect the public order and morality.”28 However, ideological cleavages and violence that 
subsequently ensued in society led to the idea that they had been brought about due to the 
existence of too much freedom. In reaction, the 1982 Constitution restricted civil society and 
                                                 
25 Michael Lake (Former EU Ambassador in Turkey 1991-98); “NGOs in Hungary,” in 
conference Turkish NGOs and the EU Reform Process, 19-20 November 2004, Istanbul 
 
26  For further information, see:  Kızılyaprak, Zeynel (ed); Laws, Ethics and Earthquake: 
Civil Society Organizations,” History Foundation of Turkey, 2000 
 
27 Paul Kubicek; “The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in 
Turkey,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No.2 (Summer 2001) 
 
28 Özbudun,  p. 129 
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CSOs by complicating the legal basis for their existence. This limitation has led to a tendency 
to form foundations, mostly because due to their relatively more practical forming style; but 
due to economic constraints and other reasons, the most widespread NGO type in Turkey is 
clearly the "associations."29  
 
In 1995, the laws banning the cooperation and organic relations between political parties 
and syndicates, associations, foundations, chambers, cooperatives and such NGOs were 
abolished. By then, organizations having a broad basis had also come to exercise a strong 
influence on the development of civil society as well.30   
 
Last not but not the least, the EU’s impact on the development of civil society in Turkey 
will be given in details in the following chapters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Ozan Erözden; "Notes on NGOs and Demands for Changing of Legal Framework;” in 
las, Taciser (ed), Hello Civil Society, Helsinki Citizens Assembly, 1997. 
 
30 Ergun Özbudun; “Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey"; in Özdalga, 
Elisabeth (ed); Persson, Sune; Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World, Turkey 
History Association, 1999 
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VI. STATUS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EU AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON TURKEY 
 
This chapter will examine the interaction of the EU with CSOs in EU countries, with a 
reference to Turkey, from a multi-dimensional perspective. First, the role of the EU in civil 
society will be looked at in terms of EU institutions. This is followed by an examination of 
the relations of those institutions with Turkish CSOs. The European Commission, European 
Parliament (EP) and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), which have 
more impact on civil society in Turkey and have bilateral relations with the Turkish CSOs, 
will be emphasized. The European Union Council is beyond the scope of this study since it is 
mainly the final decision-making body and is not easily affected by pressure from European-
wide associations. In contrast, the national associations have better access to the Council than 
to either the Parliament or Commission31. However, because Turkey, as a  
non-member state, is not represented in the Council, it will not be examined.  The Committee 
of Regions (COR) will be excluded as well due to its specialized working area, i.e., local 
bodies. There is lack of direct communication between the COR and the Turkish CSOs, as 
well. The institutions and organizations that have overall affect and a generalized scope and 
have direct interaction with Turkish organizations will be examined.  The impact of those 
three above-mentioned EU organs to Turkish CSOs will be discussed together with the 
legislative changes in Turkey concerning associations (the Law of Foundations will not be 
                                                 
31 Bouwen, P., “Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: the Logic of Access,” 
Journal of European Public Policy 9: 3, June 2002, pp. 365-390 in Lehmann, Wilhelm 
and Bosche, Lars, “Lobbying in the European Union: Current Rules and Practices,” pp. 
40-41, Luxembourg, European Parliament, 2003. 
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covered in this study as it has not yet been ratified). The institutions established in respect to 
EU organs will also be focused on. Subsequently, financial assistance of the EU to Turkey 
will be elaborated. The final topic of this chapter will be the Turkish CSOs Representations in 
Brussels.   
 
1.  EU Institutions 
Civil society and its tools have a long history in Europe that varies from country to 
country. Civil society organizations operate in the diverse social, economic, political and 
cultural settings of states. They may advocate their concerns and lobby at different levels to 
affect policy making. When lobbying at the community level, EU competency rather than the 
state competency has to be considered. They are two different institutional entities, with 
different actors, bureaucracy, and laws and regulations that have to be adhered to. 
EU member states have harmonized with respect to certain legislation and a number of 
policies. During the course of the negotiations, all the candidate countries have to adopt 
whatever binding legislation, including treaties that have been passed thus far. But the entire 
body of legislation that has to be adopted – the so-called acquis communautaire,32 is not valid 
                                                 
32    The Community acquis is the body of common rights and obligations which bind all 
the Member States together within the European Union. It is constantly evolving and 
comprises: 
• the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties;  
• the legislation adopted in application of the treaties and the case law of the Court of  
Justice;  
• the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union;  
• measures relating to the common foreign and security policy;  
• measures relating to justice and home affairs;  
• international agreements concluded by the Community and those concluded by the 
Member States between themselves in the field of the Union's activities.  
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in the area of civil society. Therefore, member states have full competence to organize their 
own civil societies in ways enabling CSOs to operate. But this doesn’t mean that the EU stays 
out of this area. On the contrary, it also interacts with the CSOs. On the other hand, there are 
communications, white and green papers, recommendations and other such unbinding 
legislation, in addition to the directives and regulations that are obligatory. In addition, the 
interaction and will to interfere is bilateral; hence, there are also attempts from the CSOs to 
affect EU decisions: “There are now an estimated 15,000 lobbyists in Brussels, representing 
around 1,400 companies and interest groups. Within these, there are over 500 European and 
international federations, of whose members more than 5,000 belong to national associations. 
There are also about 250 offices representing countries, regional and local authorities; more 
than 200 individual firms with direct representation; about 100 management and public 
relations consultancies; and about 100 law firms specialising in EU law.33 All these lobbyists 
are trying to affect EU institutions (see Figure 2).  
                                                                                                                                                        
Thus the Community acquis comprises not only Community law in the strict sense, but 
also all acts adopted under the second and third pillars of the European Union and the 
common objectives laid down in the Treaties. The Union has committed itself to 
maintaining the Community acquis in its entirety and developing it further.  
 
Applicant countries have to accept the Community acquis before they can join the 
Union. Deviations  from the acquis are granted only in exceptional circumstances and 
are limited in scope. 
There are 35 chapters of acquis communautaire for Turkey to adopt in its legislation. 
EU Enlargement, “Acquis Communautaire”, www.deltur.cec.eu.int  
 
33 “The Persuaders,” The Bulletin: Newsweekly of European Capital,  n.11, p. 14, March 
16, 2006 
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By nature, civil society is an area that should not be organized.34 This would explain 
why there are no regulations in the area but only unbinding legislation instead, at the EU 
level. This legislation is not coercive; its goal is not interference but rather making it easier for 
the EU to help CSOs operate, helping them become more in tune with EU decisions, and 
gibing them a greater role, visibility and legitimacy. Thus, unbinding legislation is not 
restrictive but rather facilitative. 
More or less, almost all the EU Institutions have a connection with civil society 
organizations, whether with directives or with the decisions they are giving, thus having an 
impact on them. I will focus on the European Parliament, European Commission and 
European Economic and Social Committee, bodies that have more affect on CSOs in Turkey.  
Before that, an explanatory figure is given below to indicate the channels through which the 
interactions occur between the EU and the CSOs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Interview with Michael Vögele, First Secretary (Head of Section C - Financial Co-
operation, Institution Building Civil Society, The Delegation of the European 
Commission to Turkey, 2006 
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Figure 2 
 
Source: Rinus Van Schendelen, Machiavelli in Brussels: The Art of Lobbying the EU, 
Amsterdam University Press, 2005 
 
 
         A. European Parliament 
The European Parliament (EP) represents all the people in the member states. It is a 
public institution that gets its legitimacy from the fact that its members (MEPs) have been 
elected directly by the people elected. This has been the case since 1979. Since 2007, the EP 
has 785 MEPs representing 27 member states, which will change with the proposed European 
Constitution to be ratified by 2009.  
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EP has three main functions:  legislative, supervisory (executive) and budgetary (control 
of the budget). 
 
The EP has enhanced its power and authorities through several treaties. “The 1992 
Maastricht Treaty and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty have transformed the European Parliament 
from a purely consultative assembly into a legislative parliament, exercising powers similar to 
those of the national parliaments.”35 The EP has combined the decision-making process with 
the co-decision procedure36 along with the Council.  Therefore, the EP’s legislative power is 
derived from its role in the co-decision procedure that it exercises with the Council. This 
decision procedure “puts the European Parliament and the Council on an equal footing and 
[has led] to the adoption of joint Council and European Parliament acts. Through the co-
decision procedure, many more Parliamentary amendments find their way into Community 
laws and no text can now be adopted without the formal agreement of the European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union.”37 
 
                                                 
35 EU Institutions, European Parliament, www.deltur.cec.eu.int   
 
36 The codecision procedure (Article 251 of the EC Treaty) was introduced by the Treaty 
of Maastricht. It gives the European Parliament the power to adopt instruments jointly 
with the Council of the European Union. The procedure comprises one, two or three 
readings. It has the effect of increasing contacts between the Parliament and the Council, 
the co-legislators, and with the European Commission. In practice, it has strengthened 
Parliament's legislative powers in the following fields: the free movement of workers, 
right of establishment, services, the internal market, education (incentive measures), 
health (incentive measures), consumer policy, trans-European networks (guidelines), 
environment (general action programme), culture (incentive measures) and research 
(framework programme). 
“Europa Glossary”   http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/codecision_procedure_en.htm  
37 www.deltur.cec.eu.int  
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The Parliament also has the power to adopt the budget of the EU. The budget of the 
following year does not come into force until it has been signed by the President of the 
European Parliament, giving the Union the financial resources it needs for the upcoming year.  
The Parliament also exercises supervisory power over all Community activities. This 
power, which was originally applied to the activities of the Commission only, has been 
extended to the Council of Ministers, the European Council and the political cooperation 
bodies that are accountable to Parliament. The EP plays a crucial role in the process of 
appointing the Commission. After approving the nomination for Commission President, 
Parliament holds hearings with the nominee Commissioners and then appoints the 
Commission by a vote of confidence. The EP also has the right to censure the Commission. 
Besides the President and Conference of Presidents, the Parliament has eight political 
groups, which represent the national parties under umbrella organizations. These groups, 
along with the other organs of the EP, meet in Strasbourg at least once a month for plenary 
sessions. In order to prepare these sessions, there are standing and temporary committees in 
which the MEPs participate. There is a secretariat that organizes the work of the EP. Lastly, 
there are “Interparliamentary Delegations” and “Joint Parliamentary Committees” to maintain 
the relations with the parliaments of states linked to the European Union by the third 
countries. These will be examined later, with reference to Turkey.  
Lobbying is an attempt to influence the decision-making process. Even though in 
Turkey lobbying has negative connotations (and mostly thought of in terms of activities 
conducted for economic and political interests by particular actors), in the EU or at the level 
of member states, it is a natural part of the political process. Lobbyists may involve several 
actors. For example, a non-governmental organization may advocate such issues as the 
environment or a firm might be trying to protect its interests.  
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Compared to other institutions, the European Parliament was not a very favorable place 
to lobby till the Single European Act (1987). From then on, the Parliament’s power was 
enhanced. As a result, lobbyists began to target the EP.38  Particularly decentralized 
governments and private interest groups show an intense lobby activity inside the EP, as they 
find this institution, more than any other, to be open for communication and influence, both 
internal and in regard to the Commission and Council. To provide an example, the European 
Parliament is the only Community institution that meets and deliberates in public. Its debates, 
opinions and resolutions are published in the Official Journal of the European Union.39 This 
relative openness and accessibility makes the EP a very appealing place. According to August 
2006 figures, there are about 4260 lobbyists accredited to European Parliament.40 “It has been 
estimated that there are about 70,000 individual contacts per year between the Members of the 
European Parliament and interest groups.”41 The accreditation system of the EP makes it 
obligatory to register in order to enter buildings, attend the concerned meetings (public 
hearings) or make a contact inside. Lobbyists have to obtain badges with their names that 
have to be renewed periodically. They either contact MEPs face to face or they contact them 
via e-mail or mail. Lobbyists pay more attention to the MEPs who are reporters or committee 
chairs. This is because Parliamentarians holding these positions serve as gatekeepers of the 
Parliament by controlling the channels through which the information that helps form the 
                                                 
38  Wilhelm Lehmann and Lars Bosche, “Lobbying in the European Union: Current 
Rules and Practices,” p. 33, Luxembourg, European Parliament, 2003 
39 Official Website of European Parliament, www.europarl.eu.int  
40 This figure is taken from the accreditation department of the European Parliament in 
reply to my request for the numbers.  
41 Study by W.  Wessels cited in Wilhelm Lehmann and Bosche,  Lobbying in the 
European Union, p. 33, 2003 
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opinions and decisions of other Parliamentarians enter the Parliament42. The EP also holds 
public hearings on different issues, including civil society. For example, in April 2006, the EP 
held a “Forum on Civil Society” to which it invited different CSOs and MEPs. This two-day 
forum, which I also attended, focused on the participation of European citizens in the debates 
on the future of Europe and the necessity of improving the EU's credibility in the eyes of the 
public. During the discussions carried out there, the CSOs had the chance to voice their 
difficulty in participating in the decision-making process and in getting their demands heard.  
 
 
Based on this information, I would like to describe the relationship of the Turkish CSOs 
with the EP.  
 
There are around ten lobbyists (March 2007 figures) from Turkish CSOs43 who are 
accredited to operate at the EP and therefore have badges permitting them to enter EP 
buildings. They are allowed to attend meetings of concern to them, organize meetings about 
Turkey in the EP and make bilateral contacts with functionaries or MEPs. These CSOs also 
inform the EP about developments in Turkey, thus acting like an information channel. 
Additionally, the EP and other institutions may contact CSOs to consult on specialized issues. 
This is also valid for the reports of the Parliament on Turkey, which are released annually. 
When the reporter is making his report, he may consult CSOs in Turkey and in the EU to get 
their ideas and benefit from research done on the specific topics. As I have observed, Turkish 
and EU CSOs may convey their concerns on the views, reports and decisions concerning 
Turkey, as well. These interactions between the Turkish CSOs and the EU Institutions, 
                                                 
42 Ibid 
 
         43 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/lobbyAlphaOrderByOrg.do?letter=A&language=EN   
   26
including the EP, will be examined in more detail latter under the heading “Lobbying in 
Brussels.” 
 
Finally, there is a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) between the European 
Parliament and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT). “The legal basis for the 
activities of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee is Article 27 of the same Ankara 
Agreement (entry into force 1964) which calls upon the Association Council to facilitate 
cooperation between the EP and the GNAT. The EU-Turkey JPC was established on the basis 
of the European Parliament's resolution of 14 May 1965 and the resolutions of the GNAT and 
the Turkish Senate, adopted respectively on 22 June and 14 July 1965 and on the basis of a 
decision by the EEC Turkey Association Council of 1965.”44 
JPC Meetings between Turkey and EP are held twice a year. The topics of the meetings 
are determined in line with the developments of EU-Turkey relations and the domestic agenda 
in Turkey with a reference to EU. The meetings are held alternatively in Turkey and in the 
European Parliament. At the 56. Meeting held in Turkey, civil society organizations 
contributed to the discussions as well. The 56. JPC Meeting in Ankara, conducted on May 
2006, the delegation members allocated the final day to meeting with students and civil 
society organizations at a university, an event that was planned as a part of the agenda. 
Several references were made to civil society organizations and the related legislation at the 
JPC meetings as well. The last (57.) JPC Meeting, which took place on November 2006, in 
Brussels, hosted several Turkish Civil Society Organizations operating in Brussels in order to 
                                                 
44 Information Note on the Work of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, 
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, June 2004 
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exchange views. It was the first time that CSOs were invited to a JPC Meeting in Brussels; 
before that, they had only participated in meetings held in Turkey.   
 
         B. European Commission 
The European Commission is a supranational body in the sense that it serves to 
aggregate the interests of the EU. The civil servants there do not work to protect the interests 
of their respective home countries, which is what is done at the Council. Moreover, different 
from the Parliament, the Commission is not divided into political affiliations. Instead, the 
Commission is broken down into different Directorate-Generals (DGs), which focus on 
different specialized issues, such as agriculture or trade. At the highest level, there are 
Commissioners representing the DGs.   
The European Commission proposes new legislation,45 policies and programs of action, 
and it is responsible for implementing the decisions of the Parliament and the Council. Thus, 
the Commission is the main executive organ of the EU.  
The Commission releases several White and Green papers, standards (consultation), 
initiatives, discussion papers, dialogues, databases and articles in the Treaties to organize its 
relations with the CSOs. There are also several CSOs that have relations with Commission. 
This unbinding legislation and the structures of interaction will be explained through the 
following issues, which will be elaborated upon one by one under separate headings: 
• White Paper on European Governance 
• Green Paper on European Transparency Initiative, additional with a reference   to        
Communication on “General principles and minimum standards for consultation of 
interested parties by the Commission” 
• Social Dialogue 
• European Constitution 
                                                 
45 When proposing a new law, it must choose which procedure –codecision, consultation 
or assent- to follow. The choice will, in principle, depend on the 'legal basis' of the 
proposal; EU Decision-Making Process, www.deltur.cec.eu.int 
   28
• CONECCS 
• Civil Society Development Center 
• National Agency 
• The Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey and EU Information Centers 
• Euromed 
• The Secretariat General for European Affairs  
• The Central Finance and Contracts Unit 
 
         i. White Paper on European Governance 
The concept “governance” has received extensive attention in the literature and the 
media, especially in recent decades. Putting one’s vote in the ballot box at election time is no 
longer sufficient to satisfy the political needs of citizens. People are much more conscious and 
concerned about domestic and international agendas. Citizens have begun to believe that 
domestic and global issues and the actions of the states are no longer just within the 
competence of governments alone. As Strange states, “Politics is a common activity; it is not 
confined to politicians and their officials.”46 Citizens would like to affect the political 
decisions that directly affect them. They use such different means as petitions, referendums, 
joining civil society organizations, and conducting demonstrations. All these transformations 
in governing style and the changing role of the citizen in the state system have created the 
term “governance” in the literature. Actually it is not a new term but has started to be used 
frequently over the last fifteen years, mainly due to the impact of the World Bank and other 
international institutions.47 It simply means that if a public decision is to be made, all the parts 
that will be affected by the decision should be included into the decision-making process.  
 
                                                 
46 Suzan Strange, The Retreat of the State: Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 12, 1999, Cambridge 
 
47 Korel Göymen, “We are Obliged to Practice Governance,” pp. 67-76, Journal of Civil 
Society, 2 (6-7), 2004 
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Among the large number of governance models in existence, three types of governance 
that have particular relevance to EU affairs will be presented:48 “Multi-level governance, 
networked governance, and expertise-based governance. Multi-level governance model is 
most frequently used when describing the EU situation. It stresses the layered functioning of 
Union, national and regional bodies, but neglects the increasing difficulty in locating shared 
competencies according to geographical or hierarchical criteria. It is closely coupled to 
constitutional discussions in legal circles.” 49   
In the case of the EU, a high tendency towards governance can be observed. At the 
beginning, EU was begun as an elitist project by politicians, and continued as such for many 
years, with publics unaware of the EU’s role and influence. This situation started to change 
with the attempts of the EU Institutions and the rising importance and role of the EU. 
However, when Eurobarometer’s50 results for the publics of the member states are checked, it 
clearly can be seen that EU citizens are still not very conscious of the institution of which they 
are a part. Based on these findings and in an attempt to fill the void that exists between EU 
and its citizens, there have been increasing attempts from the Commission to include the EU 
citizens in the evolving EU project – something that would bring more credibility, legitimacy, 
accountability and democracy to the union. The Commission recognized civil dialogue as one 
                                                 
48 There are also “new” and “old” governance debates in respect to EU functioning. For 
further information, see Joanne Scott, David M. Trubeck; “Mind the Gap: Law and New 
Approaches to Governance in the European Union,” European Law Journal, Vol.8, 
No:1, March 2002  
 
49 Governance models and the related data are taken from “The New Europe: 
Governance in a Union of Up to 30 Member States,” working paper of European 
Parliament, p. 17, 2002 
 
50 Eurobarometer contains the surveys of Public Opinion in the EU conducted to analyze 
its views on different issues. Since 1973, the European Commission has been 
monitoring the evolution of public opinion in the Member States, thus helping in the 
preparation of texts, decision-making and the evaluation of its work.  
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/description_en.htm   
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of the tools that could be used to get the people and the EU closer to each other. In its 
Communication on Promoting the Role of Voluntary Organizations and Foundations in 
Europe,51 the Commission stated  the civil dialogue as that which would [ensure] that the 
views and the grassroots experience of the voluntary sector [could] be systematically taken 
into account by policymakers at European level so that policies can be tailored more to meet 
real needs and to disseminate information from the European level down to the local level so 
that citizens are aware of developments, can feel part of the construction of Europe and can 
see the relevance of it to their own situation, thus increasing transparency and promoting 
citizenship.52 Three years later, in 2000, the Commission has released a discussion paper53 
which tried to suggest ways to develop the relationship with NGOs (the concerned 
organizations are called NGOs in the paper). It gave guidelines for the basis of EU-NGO 
relations and suggested several instruments that could be used by NGOs to help them 
contribute to policy making. Subsequently, on July 25, 2001, the Commission published a 
White Paper54 on “European Governance.” Through this paper, the Commission reacted to “a 
wide variety of concerns regarding policymaking in the EU: lack of policy effectiveness and 
coherence, poor implementation, excessive reliance on a top-down approach, the aloofness of 
the political decision-making process from citizens and the lack of democratic 
                                                 
51 The European Commission Communication on Promoting the Role of Voluntary 
Organizations and Foundations in Europe, 1997, Brussels 
52 Kenneth A. Armstrong; “Rediscovering Civil Society: The European Union and the 
White Paper on Governance,” European Law Journal, Vol.8, No. 1, March 2002  
 
53 The European Commission Discussion Paper: “The Commission and Non-
Governmental Organizations: Building a Stronger Partnership,” 18 January 2000, 
Brussels  
54 Commission White Papers are documents containing proposals for Community action 
in a specific area. In some cases they follow a Green Paper published to launch a 
consultation process at European level. When a White Paper is favorably received by the 
Council, it can lead to an action programme for the Union in the area concerned.  
Source: European Union Glossary 
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legitimization.”55  This paper laid out concepts, principles, roles and processes. According to 
it, the European Governance refers to the rules, processes and behaviors that affect the way in 
which powers are exercised at the European level, particularly as regards to openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. These five “principles of good 
governance” reinforce those of subsidiarity56 and proportionality.57 Based on these principles, 
this paper gives the following proposals:  
• Refocus the roles and responsibilities of each Institution,  
• Set out the conditions for establishing EU regulatory agencies.   
• Support the clearer definition of EU policy objectives and improve the effectiveness of 
EU policies,  
• Build public confidence in the way policy makers use expert advice.  
• Make greater use of the skills and practical experience of regional and local actors.  
• Structure the EU’s relationship with civil society: This is the most relevant, direct 
objective concerning this thesis topic. According to this proposal, a code of conduct for 
consultation will identify responsibilities and improve accountability of all partners, 
which will enhance dialogue, and contribute to the openness of organized civil society. 
Consultation process of the Commission has several tools and documents, which will be 
discussed in details in the following heading.       
 
         ii. Consultation of the Commission with Civil Society Organizations 
“Before making proposals, the Commission must be aware of new situations and 
issues developing in Europe and it must consider whether the EU legislation is the 
best way to deal with them. That is why the Commission consults and is in 
constant touch with external parties when elaborating its policies. It also consults 
within the framework of the legislative process, two advisory bodies - the 
European Economic and Social Committee (representing various socio-economic 
organizations in Member States) and the Committee of the Regions (made up of 
                                                 
55  Dieter Schmidtchen, Preface European Governance, M. H, H. K., D. S and M. S. 
(ed), Mohr Siebeck, 2003. 
56 Subsidiarity means, problems should be dealt with the closest government unit to the 
source of the problem. This has given new authorities and sources to local governments; 
thereby narrowed down the decision-making scale and stressed. the importance of non-
governmental organizations in local areas. 
Source: Aydın Uğur, "New Actors of New Democracy: NGOs," in Ulaş, Taciser (ed), 
Hello Civil Society, Helsinki Citizens Assembly, 1997. 
 
57 When various forms of intervention are available to the Union, it must, where the 
effect is the same, opt for the approach which leaves the greatest freedom to the Member 
States and individuals. Source: Europa Glossary 
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representatives of local and regional authorities), and seeks the opinions of 
national parliaments and governments. The very objective of consultation is to 
ensure that interested parties are heard properly in the policy-making process. 
Consultation with stakeholders at an early stage of policy shaping helps to 
improve the policy outcome and at the same time enhances the involvement of 
interested parties and the public at large. Consultation of interested parties thus 
complements the process of policy shaping. In its consultation policy the 
Commission applies the principle of openness. Everybody must be able to provide 
the Commission with input. Therefore, there is no general registration or 
accreditation system for interest groups. The Commission does not want to limit 
its consultations to a certain number of pre-screened or accredited 
organizations”58.    
                                                                                                                                                  
The above quotation delineates the main purpose and principles of the Commission 
when it consults CSOs. The Commission consults various bodies both in the EU and at the 
level of member states and civil society organizations with the objective of filling the void 
existing between the actors it affects (with the decisions it makes) and itself. In this way, the 
Commission tries to make the most efficient decisions satisfying the needs of the market and 
citizens. 
Consultation takes place in the policy formation process before policy is made. But just 
to be clear, it should be pointed out that consultation does not mean that all the views of the 
actors it consults will be adopted. Nor does it function through co-decision or via by-pass 
whereby all of the views of the CSOs are neglected.59 Consultation is simply means taking 
other actors’ views into consideration. Different levels of influence would be made by the 
views of the CSOs. There are different means of consultation. These include, for example, 
organizing meetings or open public debates. There is also the website “Your-Voice-In-
                                                 
58 “The European Commission and Civil Society,” Consultation 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/index_en.htm    
 
59 Interview with Giorgos Glynos, Adviser of Civil Society Dialogue, European 
Commission, DG Enlargement, Turkey Team, 2006  
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Europe”60 through which the Commission’s open public consultations are announced. In this 
way, interested parties sides have the opportunity to follow and participate in the debates.  
Under another heading, the role of the European Economic and Social Committee (an 
advisory body of the EU) in the consultation process will be looked at further, but now the 
relations of CSOs with the Commission will be examined. 
 
         iii. CONECCS 
According to the openness principle of the Commission, CSOs do not require 
accreditation to be consulted or to enter Commission buildings, contrary to what is necessary 
in the case of the European Parliament. Therefore, CSOs may voluntarily register themselves 
with the CONECCS. The CONECCS61 is the database for Consultation, the European 
Commission and Civil Society. “In the White Paper 'Reforming the Commission' (COM 
(2000) 200 of 1.3.2000) the Commission committed itself to establishing a list of committees 
and expert groups which are involved in formal or structured consultation procedures and in 
which civil society organizations participate. The overall objective is to make the dialogue 
with civil society organizations more transparent”62 which is one of the reasons for forming 
the CONECCS. The second reason concerns enabling European civil society organizations to 
make themselves known to the Commission, thus increasing the list of potential consultation 
                                                 
60 http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/consultations/index_en.htm  
 
61 For further information, see the website of Coneccs 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/coneccs/index_en.htm  
 
62 Ibid. 
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partners.63 The third reason has to do with the Commission itself – it makes it possible for it 
to see all various CSOs in the field, facilitating access to consultative parties.  
The White Paper on European Governance, which was elaborated in the previous 
section, recommended the publication of a review of existing sectoral consultative forums.64 
To achieve this goal, the CONECCS website was formed. 
The CONECCS is divided into two parts: Consultative Bodies and Civil Society 
Organizations. 
Consultative Bodies are the lists that the Commission consults. The Commission may 
form them through decisions, such as the “Advisory Committee on the Common Agriculture 
Policy,” or the consultative body forms on its own and is then consulted by the Commission.  
The consultative bodies on the list given involve the CSOs that are consulted in a formal and 
structured way - meaning relatively regular meetings of a group in which civil society 
organizations participate. Committees that are composed solely of the representatives of the 
Member States are not included on the list. The bodies should be umbrella organizations 
composed of the CSOs of several countries. “The number of consultative bodies of a 
Directorate-General of the Commission or on a specific policy area does not correlate with the 
activity of consultation of civil society within the Directorate-General or the policy area in 
question.”65  Therefore, the DGs have flexibility in their relations with the CSOs they consult. 
They would determine the target group, level of consultation and the means by their will.66 
                                                 
63 Ibid. 
 
64 Ibid. 
 
65 Ibid. 
 
66 Interview with Lea Vatanen, Dg General Services, European Commission, 2006 
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The list of “Civil Society Organizations” is only for creating a database to inform. 
Because there is no consensus or legal definition for the term civil society organizations, the 
Commission uses the definition of the European Economic and Social Committee67 here for 
the CONECCS that involve such actors as: 
 so-called labor-market players (i.e. trade unions and employers    federations, also called 
the social partners) 
 organizations representing social and economic players which are not social partners in 
the strict sense of the term 
 NGOs(non-governmental organizations) which bring people together in a common 
cause, such as environmental organizations, human rights organizations, consumer 
associations, charitable organizations, educational and training organizations. 
 CBOs (community-based organizations, i.e. organizations set up within society at 
grassroots level which pursue member-oriented objectives), e.g., youth organizations, 
family associations and all organizations through which citizens participate in local and 
municipal life. 
 religious communities. 
Even though there are no criteria in the CONECCS to exclude the candidate countries 
and their CSOs and consultative bodies from candidate countries exist, there are no Turkish 
ones on either list. The only time a Turkish CSO appears to be present is when it is a member 
of an umbrella organization at the European level such as the UNICE or EUROCHAMBERS 
(of which TUSIAD, TOBB, ITKIB, TUR-BO, and other CSOs are members). Then they are 
represented indirectly in the CONECCS. However, they do not take part in the formation of a 
consultative body themselves. Neither are they on the list of CSOs. This doesn’t mean that the 
Commission does not interact with Turkish CSOs; there have been many bilateral contacts 
between Turkish civil society organizations and the Commission over the years. But as a rule, 
bilateral contacts are not made in the scope of CONECCS.  
 
                                                 
67 http://www.ces.eu.int/pages/en/acs/SCO/SCO_accueil_en.htm  
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         iv. Social Dialogue 
Consultation is stipulated with the Amsterdam Treaty in which it is said, “The 
Commission should consult widely before proposing legislation, and wherever appropriate, 
publish consultation documents.”68 The EESC and COR are the advisory bodies that the 
Commission consults. Additionally, the Commission consults the social partners within the 
social dialogue regulated through articles 137-139 of the same treaty.69  Social dialogue 
consists of the discussions, consultations, negotiations and joint actions undertaken by the 
social partner organizations, which are the employee and employer organizations –social 
partners. The definition of these social partners is not legal but operational.70 These partners 
will be trade unions, syndicates and employer representatives.  
 Social actors may get involved at different levels: supranational (in this case it is the 
EU), national and subnational level. “At the European level, there is a bipartite dialogue 
between European employers and trade union organizations, which involves negotiating 
collective agreements.”71  “The second one is a tripartite (formal) dialogue involving 
interaction between the social partners and the public authorities.”72 “This is largely with the 
Employment Committee, which also works in cooperation with the Social Protection 
                                                 
68 Protocol No 7 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
Amsterdam Treaty, cited in the website of Social Dialogue of the Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/index_en.htm 
  
69 “The European Commission and Civil Society,” Consultation 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/index_en.htm  
 
70 Interview with Giorgos Glynos, Adviser of Civil Society Dialogue, European 
Commission, DG Enlargement, Turkey Team, 2006 
 
71 Catherine Barnard; “The Social Partners and the European Agenda,” p 80, European 
Law Journal, Vol.8, No.1, March 2002  
 
72 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/index_en.htm 
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Committee. It has contacts with social partners. And Employment Committee is obliged to 
consult.”73  
Evolution of European social dialogue is given in a chart in the annex - 1. 
Social dialogue is a part of European Governance and Consultation but with a slight 
difference. Unlike the consultation with CSOs in general, social partners have a role in 
making legislation and an impact on it.74 European social dialogue has resulted in a variety of 
outcomes, including the adoption of over 300 joint texts by the European social partners. 
Combining the values of responsibility, solidarity and participation, European social dialogue 
complements the national practices of social dialogue that exist in most Member States.75  
There are several social partners recognized by the EU. They have to meet certain 
criteria in order to be eligible and legitimate. They must be:  
• cross-industry, or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organized at European 
level  
 
• consist of organizations which are themselves an integral and recognized part of 
Member States' social partner structures and with the capacity to negotiate agreements, 
and which are representative of all Member States, as far as possible 
• have adequate structures to ensure the effective participation in the consultation process  
 
The social partners having these features and accepted by the EU are extensive umbrella 
organizations all over EU. These include, for example, the ETUC (European Trade Union 
Confederation), Eurocadres (representing managerial staff), FERPA (European Federation of 
Retired and Older People), and UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations 
                                                 
73 Barnard, 2002 
 
74 Interview with Lea Vatanen, European Commission, DG General Services, 2006 
 
75 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/index_en.htm 
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of Europe). There are a couple of Turkish CSOs, such as TUISAD, that are members of some 
of these social partners. TUSIAD has been a member of UNICE since 1987. Thus, the interest 
of Turkish businessmen are also represented on a larger scale via UNICE.  
         
 
         v. Green Paper76 on a European Transparency Initiative (ETI) 
The European Transparency Initiative was adopted very recently (March 3, 2006). 
Through this initiative, the Commission launched a review of its overall approach to 
transparency, and wanted to identify and stimulate a debate on areas for improving it, as it is 
indicated in the initiative itself.  
 
In the first part, the initiative provides a history of previously released papers related to 
transparency. It elaborates the achievements made subsequent to being adopted. Because it is 
a Green Paper, this paper is, by nature, for discussion and consultation. In each chapter of the 
paper, there are several questions. Mainly three issues are concerned: The need for a more 
structured framework for the activities of interest representatives (lobbyists), feedback on the 
European Commission’s minimum standards for consultation, and mandatory disclosure of 
information about the beneficiaries of EU funds under shared management. The Commission 
is expected to accept the views of the interested parties till the deadline of August 31, 2006.  
 
                                                 
76 Green Papers are documents published by the European Commission to stimulate 
discussion on given topics at the European level. They invite the relevant parties (bodies 
or individuals) to participate in a consultation process and debate on the basis of the 
proposals they put forward. Green Papers may give rise to legislative developments that 
are then outlined in White Papers.  Source: Green Paper, Europa Glossary, European 
Commission  
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In the second part of the paper, the definitions of “lobbying and lobbyists,”77 covering a 
wide range of actors, are given. It focuses on the principles upon which the relations between 
the EU Institutions and lobbyists are based. Moreover, current bilateral problems are 
highlighted.  
 
The Green Paper then discusses the “General Principles and Minimum Standards for the 
Consultation of Interest Parties,”78 which was adopted on December 11, 2002. This section 
entails extensive coverage of principles concerning transparency.  
 
Minimum standards are based on openness and accountability in order to contribute to 
EU policy development. It should be clear as to which organization they represent and how 
inclusive that representation is. The CONECCS system and accreditation procedures of the 
EU Institutions are then given. Lastly, a view on the application of the minimum standards is 
provided.  
 
In the third part, brief information is included about EU funds while stressing the 
importance of transparency.  
 
 
                                                 
77 Lobbying: All activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy 
formulation and decision- making processes of the European Institutions.  
    Lobbyists: persons carrying out such activities, working in a variety of organizations 
such as public affairs consultancies, law firms, NGOs, think-tanks, corporate lobby units 
(“in-house representatives”) or trade associations. 
    Source: Green Paper on European Transparency Initiative     
 
78 This is a very basic paper that also provides definitions of civil society organizations – 
cited from EESC’s definition”, determining the standards of consultation between the 
EU Institutions and CSOs. But it is not a restrictive paper; it draws the outline of the 
basic principles and areas in which they operate, but inside those areas the actors are 
free to operate so long as they do not violate the principles.  
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         vi. The European Constitution 
The Treaty for European Constitution, which provides the EU with a more supranational 
structure, was signed by 25 member states and three candidate countries (Turkey, Bulgaria, 
and Romania) in Rome on October 29, 2004 in after many long years of debating and content 
formation. But in order for the Treaty establishing the Constitution to be put into effect; it 
would have to be adopted by each of the signatory member states in accordance with its own 
constitutional procedures: this is called the ratification of the Treaty by the Member States. 
This should be done through either referendum or parliamentary ratification.79 France and 
Netherlands chose the method of referendum, according to their own legislation, and their 
publics rejected the Constitution. The ratification is still continuing in the other countries but 
these rejections have created a set back to the adoption of the Constitution. A period of 
reflection decided upon by the European Council on June 2005 has started and the deadline 
for ratifying the Constitutional Treaty has been extended indefinitely. 
  
If the Constitution enters into force, it will integrate the “Charter for Fundamental 
Rights,” which will not only establish the values and objectives but also, the principles that 
underlie the relationship between the Union and its Member States.80 Additionally, “article 
4781 sets out the general principles of participatory democracy in the EU. This article 
                                                 
79 Ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,    
 http://europa.eu/constitution/ratification_en.htm   
  
80 Summary of the agreement on the Constitutional Treaty, June 28, 2004, EU  
 
81 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe - Article 47 : 
 
    The Principles of Participatory Democracy 
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mentions, in particular, the maintenance of open, transparent and regular dialogue between 
European institutions and representative associations and civil society. It also mentions that 
the Commission "shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure 
that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent".”82  Thus, the Constitution (in Draft 
form currently), gives a more space and legitimacy for the CSOs to operate inside the EU.  
 
 
      vii. Bilateral Interaction with Turkey 
 
 
a. Legislative Changes in Turkey under the Effect of the EU and the  
Commission Reports 
Regular Reports are a component of the pre-accession strategy. These reports are 
regularly prepared by the European Commission every year and put forth proposals by 
evaluating the progress achieved by the candidate countries. They are used by the Council in 
deciding whether to carry on with the negotiations with existing candidate countries or to 
                                                                                                                                                        
1.The institutions shall, by appreciate means, give citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all 
areas of Union action. 
2. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with 
representative associations and civil society. 
3. The Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to 
ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent. 
4. Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of 
Member States may take the initiative of inviting the Commission, within the 
framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens 
consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the 
Constitution. European laws shall determine the provisions for the procedures and 
conditions required for such a citizens’ initiative, including the minimum number of 
Member States from which such citizens must come.  
 
 Source: Official Journal of the European Union 
    
82 The European Union and Civil Society, General Overview, 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/index_en.htm  
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include in negotiations countries that have newly entered the candidacy process according to 
accession criteria.83 
 
The Commission first began releasing reports on Turkey in 1998. Since then, the 
Commission has been constantly referring to restrictions on freedom of associations in Turkey 
and referring to particular cases. After the first two reports (1998 and 1999), Turkey was 
given the status of candidateship at the Helsinki Summit. As a result, “from 2000 onwards, 
the Commission reports devoted much more space to freedom of association in Turkey.”84 
The Commission has evaluated developments occurring within Turkey – including national 
programs and reform packages prepared by the Turkish government – and has made 
recommendations concerning further expectations. Thus, these reports will be examined in 
accordance with developments in Turkey.   
 
A number of developments have occurred on the Turkish side since the Helsinki 
Summit. These include a revision of the Civil Code in November 22, 2001, which was 
published in the official newspaper on December 8, 2001 and went into effect on January 1, 
2003.85 The New Civil Code (No. 4721) completely replaced the former one (the Civil Code 
of 1926 has been revised fifteen times since its inception86). Moreover, a new Law of 
Associations required a set of reform packages dealing with civil society organizations (the 4th 
and 7th Reform Packages [2003]). 
                                                 
83 Representation of the European Commission to Turkey, www.deltur.cec.eu.int  
 
84 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Turkish Political Culture and the European Union, 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2005, University of London. 
 
85 http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/medenikanun/indexmk.html  
 
86 http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/medenikanun/tarihce.html  
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The Turkish Government prepared a National Program in 2001 and submitted it to the 
European Commission. The program was further revised in 2003. National Programs are 
prepared for the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire (the entire body of EU legislation), 
which indicates in detail how the candidate country envisages implementing the Accession 
Partnership priorities and preparing for integration with the EU. In this way, the National 
Program complements the Accession Partnership. It includes a timetable for the achievement 
of objectives and, when necessary, indicates the human and financial resources to be 
allocated.87 The Turkish National Program, submitted to the Commission on March 2001, was 
adopted by the Council of Ministers. Within this framework, Turkey started to release Reform 
Packages from 2002 onwards. The packages contained changes concerning freedom of 
associations and civil society organizations.  
 
The reforms made to the “Associations Law” have been carried out in stages and have 
been subjected to debate.88 Articles 4, 5, 6, 34, 38 and 43 of the Associations Law were 
changed under the second reform package on March 26, 2002. With the change of Article 4, 
“Entitlement to Establish Associations,” several restrictions which had prohibited persons 
sentenced for specific crimes were lifted. With the change of Article 5, “Associations Subject 
                                                 
87 www.deltur.cec.eu.int  
 
88 see the annex for changes 
For the changes brought with the reform packages and with the New Associations Law 
and the Civil Code, the following sources will be used: 
Ege Erkoçak; The Changes with the EU Reform Packages: The articles brought in 
respect to the extension of freedom of associations and their former states,” 11 
November 2005, Secretariat General of European Affairs   
 
   Third Sector Foundation of Turkey, http://www.tusev.org.tr  
 Belgenet, http://www.belgenet.com 
 EU Communication Group, www.abig.org.tr  
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to Restrictions and Prohibited Activities,” restrictions on several types of associations were 
eliminated. With the change of Article 6, “Restriction to Use Certain Names and Signs,” some 
legal restrictions on the use of signs, flags, slogans, and unauthorized languages were lifted. 
Changes in Article 34, on “Federation and Confederations,” eliminated the requirement that 
an association be for the public benefit in order for it to form a federation. The change of 
Article 38, “Purpose and Activities of Students’ Associations,” has lifted the clause that 
prohibited the activities of student associations different from the purposes that were listed in 
the article. Lastly, the Article concerning “Relations with Foreign Associations and 
Organizations,” which required that permission be sought from the Foreign Ministry and 
Interior Ministry to have relations with foreign associations and institutions was changed so 
that such permission was no longer necessary. A notification clause was introduced instead.   
 
The Third Reform Package of August 3, 2002 brought changes to Articles 11, 12, 15, 
39, 40, 45, 46, 47, 56, 62, and 73.89 The most crucial ones were the formation of a Department 
of Associations under the Interior Ministry (Art 46, 73) and the lifting of restrictions on the 
freedom of civil servants to form associations (Art 39). Until this reform package, the 
authorization to facilitate the services related to associations belonged to the Directorate 
General of Security (“Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü”). With the third reform package, the 
transfer of this body to the Interior Ministry was not simply a technical issue but rather a 
symbol of “civilizing (sivilleştirme) of civil society services.” The reference to civilizing here 
does not mean a change from uniform to civilian clothing, which is the common 
understanding and usage in Turkey,90 or have anything to do with “civilization.” What is 
meant is a change in mentality and the contribution of individuals. Those changes are 
                                                 
89  http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/ab_uyum-1.html  
90 Interview with Haluk Tükel, General Secretary of Tüsiad, 2005 
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important steps but time is needed for the internalization of the reforms and adoption of 
behaviors in line with civil society. 
 
The only relevance of the concerned services for CSOs with the security department has 
been the technical training given to the staff of the new Department of Associations during the 
orientation period (which was completed in the first year), and supervision at the level of 
towns (in specific cases, with court permission).91  
 
With the introduction of the Department of Associations, complemented by the removal 
of restrictions on civil servants to establish associations, we see that there has been a relative 
change in the view of the state authorities towards the civil society organizations compared to 
the past.   
 
Other reforms in the Third Package have brought further freedoms to students to join 
associations (Art 56), permission to civil society organizations to undertake preparations for 
earthquakes and natural disasters (Art 40), clauses that create flexibility for associations 
founded in Turkey to operate abroad, and for associations founded in abroad to operate in 
Turkey (Art 11 and 12).      
 
 
After the Third Reform Package, the European Commission released its 2002 Regular 
Report (October 9) on Turkey. In the report, the Commission conducted a review of the 
reforms made since the Helsinki Summit of 1999. It was said that, “The decision on the 
candidate status of Turkey in Helsinki in 1999 has encouraged Turkey to introduce a series of 
                                                 
91 Interview with İsmail Çalışkan, Head of Department of State Security Department, in  
General Directorate of Security, Ministry of Interior, Turkey, 2005 
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fundamental reforms.” With respect to civil rights, the New Civil Code and three other reform 
packages were referred to and appreciated. Subsequently, however, it was said that such 
reforms were inadequate and that further reforms, especially those pertaining to the Law of 
Associations, were necessary. 
 
The Fourth Reform Package of January 2, 2003 brought further flexibility to the 
establishment of associations. Restricted types of associations were narrowed by the change in 
Article 5. Articles 11 and 12, dealing with “International Activities of Associations founded in 
Turkey” and “Activities in Turkey of Associations founded abroad,” have been abolished; in 
their place, this issue is addressed in Articles 91 and 92 of the Civil Code. Article 36 of the 
civil code stipulates that Article 92 is revised to include non-profit organizations as well. 
Articles 16 and 18 allow for the membership of legal entities in associations and stipulate the 
nature of their voting rights.    
  
With the Fifth Reform Package of January 23, 2003, Article 82 was amended to replace 
prison penalties with fines. This penalty is for situations specified under Articles 43, 45, and 
64. 
 
  
The Seventh Reform Package of July 30, 2003 brought several novelties to the 
Associations Law and the Civil Code. With the change in laws on associations, students in 
higher education acquired additional freedoms with respect to establishing student 
organizations (Art 38). With the change in Article 31, all the associations had the right to 
open more than one branch in the place they are operating, such as city, or village. Moreover, 
the six-month residency requirement for those setting up a branch in a particular location was 
abolished in Article 31.   
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Along with the changes made in the Associations Law, Articles 56, 64 and 82 were 
modified with the right of legal entities to establish associations being explicitly delineated. 
With Article 66, the six-month notice requirement when resigning from an association was 
abolished. The six-month residence requirement of the founder of a branch of an association 
was been removed in the Civil Code as well (Art 94), parallel to that stipulated in Article 31 
of the Association Law. Concerning the amendments in the Associations Law related to legal 
entities membership and their rights, Article 56, 64, 66 and 82 of the Civil Code were revised 
as well.  
 
The 2003 Report of the Commission (November 5) was released after the Seventh 
Reform Package. The fourth to seventh reform packages of the previous year were elaborated. 
These reforms and the setting up a Reform Monitoring Group for ensuring their effective 
implementation was appreciated but problems in practice were mentioned, along with specific 
examples. Limitations on the establishment of associations on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
religion, sect, region, or any other minority group were said to be revised.  
 
Eight months following the last Commission Report on Turkey, a new Associations Law 
was adopted by the GNAT (July 2004). Due to presidential veto, it did not go into effect until 
November 11, 2004, when it was published in the official newspaper. 
  
The new Law has brought several changes while maintaining those that had been 
brought with former reform packages.  
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The new law has lifted the limitations on the establishment of associations on the basis 
of race, ethnicity, religion, sect, region, or any other minority group - something that was 
stressed in the last Commission Report.   
          
The new law permits associations to conduct joint projects with, and receive financial 
support from, other associations and public institutions and removes the requirement that prior 
permission be sought to receive funds from abroad. However, these are the provisions that 
were vetoed by the President on the grounds that they were not in line with the Constitution. 
The requirement that associations seek prior permission to open branches abroad, join foreign 
bodies or hold meetings with foreigners was eliminated. The law also lifts all restrictions on 
student associations; removes the requirement of informing local government officials of 
general assembly meetings; and allows for the establishment of temporary and informal 
platforms or networks for all civil society organizations. Additionally, the law requires that 
governors issue warnings prior to taking legal action against associations and stipulates that 
the security forces are no longer allowed on an association’s premises without a court order. 
 
The new Associations Law and the Civil Code have promoted the space for CSOs to 
operate. They removed the restrictive clauses on freedom of associations and their activities.  
 
There is a draft New Foundations Law that has been discussed and voted on by the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT). It was vetoed and sent back to the Parliament 
by the President. It can be argued that if a commission specializing in “civil society” was to 
be formed in the parliament, just like any other commission, further reforms concerning 
various kinds of civil society organizations having internal and/or EU dynamics would be 
more efficient and sustainable.  
   49
    
The changes brought with the new Associations Law and comparison with the former 
one are given in “Annex 2”. 
 
After the new Associations Law, the European Commission released its Regular 
Report on Turkey (6 October 2004).  When the report was prepared and published, the new 
Associations Law had not yet been become effective because it had been vetoed by the 
president.  It is said that if the new Law on Associations were to be adopted, it would be 
significant in terms of reducing the possibility of state interference in the activities of 
associations and would contribute to the strengthening of civil society. The Civil Code 
provisions that brought novelties regarding gender equality have been mentioned. A new Law 
on Associations was passed by Parliament and vetoed by the President. While some problems 
in practice are still reported, the authorities have recently taken steps aimed at combating 
gender inequality. The novelties and developments brought with the new law are elaborated in 
detail.  
 
Released on November 6, 2004, the same day as the Regular Report, was the 
“Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession,”92 
which took a positive view of the developments in Turkey and affected the Council’s decision 
on December 27, 2004 to give a date for opening negotiations. The developments concerning 
the civil society and the new laws that have already been adopted and those that are to be 
adopted were examined. 
 
                                                 
92 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
“Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession,” Brussels, 6.10.2004 
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The recommendation foresees a three-pillar strategy: 1) fulfilling the Copenhagen 
Political Criteria, 2) implementing the acquis communautaire and 3) building a dialogue to 
bring publics together.  
  
The first pillar concerns cooperation to reinforce and support the reform process in 
Turkey, in particular in relation to the continued fulfillment of the Copenhagen political 
criteria. This will be based on a revised Accession Partnership, setting out specific priorities 
in the reform process, and an upgraded pre-accession strategy. 
  
In the second pillar, the specific conditions for the conduct of accession negotiations 
with Turkey are proposed. A number of preliminary indications are provided for the 
preparation of accession negotiations, in the event that such a decision were to be made in 
December by the European Council (which it was not yet). 
 
The third pillar suggests a substantially strengthened political and cultural dialogue 
bringing people together from the EU Member States and Turkey. According to the 
recommendation, there is a clear need to strengthen the dialogue on a number of issues 
relating to EU-Turkey relations. The dialogue should be strengthened between the EU and 
Turkey, with civil society playing the most important role. It is said that the Commission will 
present proposals on how to support such a dialogue in future. 
 
“On 17 December 2004 the European Council endorsed the European Commission 
recommendation and broadened its scope by stipulating that ´parallel to accession 
negotiations, the Union will engage in an intensive political and cultural dialogue with every 
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candidate state. With the aim of enhancing mutual understanding by bringing people together, 
this inclusive dialogue also will involve civil society´.”93 
 
       
 
         b. Civil Society Dialogue 
EU is a learning entity, growing through experience and performance. It evaluates the 
outcomes of actions taken and takes additional moves accordingly. Therefore, EU is not 
static, but rather constantly evolving. It tries to learn from its past and not to repeat mistakes. 
 
A lesson that the EU learned from the previous enlargement of ten countries is that the 
EU member states were not sufficiently informed or prepared for it.94 There was a lack of 
dialogue that would serve as a way of lessening prejudices and fears, and facilitating 
orientation. As Klösch argues, “The EU did not have a good communication strategy on 
enlargement, which was a shortcoming in the past. Public opinion was ignored. The Council 
and the Commission has started to work on this issue, trying to sell the enlargement to the 
audience.”95  Based on these arguments, along with a search for a dialogue based on the third 
pillar strategy of the “Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress 
towards Accession” in 2004, and the Council’s emphasis on cultural dialogue, the solution has 
been the Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Candidate Countries. The Commission 
                                                 
93 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: Civil Society 
Dialogue between the EU and Candidate Countries, Brussels, 29.6.2005 
 
94 “Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: Civil 
Society Dialogue between the EU and Candidate Countries,” Brussels, 29.6.2005 
 
95 Symposium, “Closing Doors but Opening Windows: Renegotiating the Future of 
Enlargement,” Bernadette Klösch, Chairman of the EU Council Working Group, 
Enlargement First Secretary (Austrian Presidency), Brussels, May 24, 2006 
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states that any future enlargement of the EU needs to be supported by a strong, deep and 
sustained dialogue between the societies of the candidate countries and the EU member states, 
as well as with the EU institutions. The main objective of the civil society dialogue to be 
developed with Turkey and Croatia is to better inform publics of the EU and candidate 
countries, by addressing the opportunities as well as the challenges posed by future 
enlargement. Since other countries are beyond the scope of this thesis, only clauses pertaining 
to Turkey will be examined.  
 
Surveys, questionnaires and studies show that, there is lack of information and 
divergence of opinions of Turkish public and of EU. Even though “public opinion in Turkey 
is strongly supportive of EU membership, the information on the history, the functioning, 
rules and policies of the EU remains poor.  Within the EU, public opinion is divided on the 
issue, with differences of opinion within and between the Member States. The EU citizens 
emphasize Turkey as a different religion, culture and values, size, income and geographical 
location.”96  Compared to other countries, the civil society dialogue becomes more crucial for 
Turkey. “The state of mutual knowledge is particularly weak with that country (he means 
Turkey here) and misconceptions and concerns more widespread.”97 Turkey is debated in the 
public sphere of the EU, where more or less all EU citizens can voice their opinion on the 
membership of Turkey – a view that is mostly negative. Turkey is one of the most debated 
issues on the European Discussion Forum, which is an official EU website where publics can 
discuss the future of Europe.98 These factors, combined with the possibility of holding a 
referendum at the end of negotiations, convinced EU publics that breaking the barriers created 
                                                 
96 Civil Society Dialogue, 2005 
 
97 Key events in Turkey - EU relations, European Commission, Enlargement,            
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkey/key_events_en.htm     
  
98 http://europa.eu/debateeurope/index_en.htm 
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by poor communication had become vital. “Turkey is not unique but only different.”99 
Perhaps more importantly, it is unknown. There is always a fear of the unknown and different. 
It is important to demonstrate that Turkey’s membership will only serve to enrich the Union. 
It will bring diversity, not conflict. While it is important to discuss both the challenges and 
opportunities, it should be done in an objective and non-manipulative way.     
  
Coming back to the civil society dialogue, the objectives can be summarized as follows:100 
 To strengthen contacts and mutual exchange of experience between all sectors of 
civil society in the member States and Candidate countries; 
 
 To ensure a better knowledge and understanding of the candidate countries 
concerned within the European Union, including their history and their culture, thus 
allowing for a better awareness of the opportunities and challenges of future 
enlargement; 
 
 To ensure a better knowledge and understanding of the European Union within the 
candidate countries, including the values on which it is founded, its functioning and 
its policies. 
 
The following issues are elaborated upon in other sections: 
A definition of civil society and its actors is given. It refers to the definition of EESC. 
This definition is as broad as possible so as to increase participation. The definition includes 
labor market actors, i.e., the social partners (trade unions and employers federations); 
organizations representing social and economic players at large (consumer organizations for 
instance); non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations, i.e., 
organizations at grassroots level through which citizens participate at the local and municipal 
level (e.g., youth or family associations); religious communities and the media.  
 
                                                 
99 Christer Asp (Swedish Ambassador to Turkey); Plenary Session in Symposium 
“Europeanization and Transformation: Turkey in the Post-Helsinki Era,” 2-3 December 
2005, Koç University, Istanbul  
 
100 Civil Society Dialogue, 2005 
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A review of the ongoing bilateral activities is given with the intention of continuing, 
strengthening and promoting them. Bilateral relations between member states, the will of 
Turkish communities to participate in civil dialogue, the activities of the joint committees of 
the European Parliament, EESC and COR, as well as other on-going EU-funded activities, 
have been evaluated. These issues are not gone into detail here so as to prevent repetition and 
avoid losing the focus of the subject. They will be examined in other sections.  
 
New activities are introduced in order to complement the ongoing ones. But it is up to 
the civil society organizations to conduct and further develop related programs. In the 
dialogue, several ongoing or expected developments concerning the civil society are 
mentioned: For example, there is the possibility of establishing a Business Council EU-
Turkey project. This is a grant scheme for engendering a number of activities and programs. 
These include, bilateral exchange projects by CSOs, gender equality twinning projects, youth, 
university and professional exchanges, cultural exchanges, participation in community culture 
and media program, and language training. Also anticipated is the encouragement of on-line 
public debate by creating a website providing information on such topics as Turkey, 
enlargement, and civil society dialogue. In addition, increasing media coverage of the life and 
society in Turkey and the EU countries, exchanging and awareness-raising of journalists and 
enhancing the dialogue with religious communities and associations are important 
components of such a project.          
 
 
Under the heading “implementation,” the Commission says that it would consult experts 
in the EU and Turkey when making proposals for future action. The Commission will finance 
the activities for the dialogue from the pre-accession assistance budget for Turkey, but other 
sponsors such as business associations, media groups may finance the events and activities as 
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well. The total amount of financing allocated from the pre-accession budget is estimated to be 
40 million Euros. When it comes to Community programs, candidate countries provide a 
contribution to the budget. The Communication Strategy on Enlargement shares with the civil 
society dialogue the objective of enhancing public debate on future enlargements in the EU 
and the candidate countries, and will thus support the civil society dialogue in several 
respects. The communication and information budget allocated to Delegations in candidate 
countries, as well as the Prince Programme budget for enlargement, targeted to actions within 
the European Union, may be used for this purpose. 
 
To manage and implement projects related to the civil society dialogue the Commission 
will rely on its existing structures and resources, both in Brussels and in the EC Delegations in 
candidate countries, as well as appropriate bodies in candidate countries. Only if needed, in 
consideration of future developments, will the possibility of setting up additional specific 
structures be considered. Existing foundations, aimed at promoting mutual knowledge and 
cultural exchanges between the EU and other world regions may be considered as examples. 
 
Problems with obtaining visas that keep Turkish nationals from participating in several 
programs and activities are mentioned. Member states’ responsibility and competence with 
respect to the visa issue are stressed and less complicated and time-consuming  procedures for 
visa application is requested. 
 
 
Though it is a late initiative, the civil society dialogue coming from the Commission is a 
very positive attempt to enable EU publics and the Turkish public to get to know each other 
better in an appropriate and organized way. Even though the Commission has taken the main 
initiative, “this dialogue is not within the competence of the EU, but rather national 
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competence. The EU may encourage, advise, fund and so on, but in the end it is the national 
policies” and the will of the concerned CSOs that will make the contribution.101 Moreover, 
Turkey is responsible for further developing the dialogue, as well.102 Both the EU and Turkey 
should seek to improve the activities foreseen in this dialogue and, if possible, create new 
ones.   
 
Although member states have been called upon within the context of the civil society 
dialogue to facilitate the visa application process, as mentioned before, visa problems are still 
common. The conversations I had with high-level civil servants in EU institutions and 
elsewhere and the difficulties I experienced obtaining a short-term visa for my traineeship at 
the European Parliament in Brussels indicate that, due to a disharmonized visa policy in the 
EU, the member states use their competence vis-à-vis control of their own visa policy as a 
justification for arbitrary practices. Therefore, Turkish applicants are either restricted in their 
ability to participate in Community programs and/or are reluctant to apply for such programs 
in the first place.  
 
In the context of this dialogue, there had been several calls for projects of different 
themes. Four of them that concern civil society area are closed for applications:  
The first one is the “Small Projects Program: Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue.” This 
umbrella project supports the broad goal of deepening and enhancing mutual understanding 
between civil society in Turkey and the EU member states. 17 projects are currently being 
carried out with partners in 13 countries. These projects cover a variety of issues, including 
                                                 
101 Interview with Glynos, 2006 
 
102 Interview with Ricardo Serri, Enlargement Team, European Commission, 2006 
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youth, business community dialogue, minority rights, regional development and disabled 
persons.103   
 
The other major project is the “Civil Society Dialogue: Europa-Bridges of 
Knowledge,” which was available until August 10th, 2006. Projects under this programme 
focus on establishing networks and strengthening existing collaboration between NGOs and 
universities based in Turkey and the EU. Its objective is to enhance Turkey’s expertise on the 
Acquis Communautaire, i.e., the body of EU law.104 Several grants that are awarded under 
call for proposals would be seen in the website of Delegation of European Commission to 
Turkey105.  
 
The third project is “Culture in Action,”106 which had a deadline until December 5, 
2006. The applicants’ eligibility and the criteria for the project were provided. This proposal 
was intended to be continuation of the “European Horizons and Mosaic Programmes,” which 
were designed as two separate initiatives in the first stage in 2002. They were then 
incorporated under a single action in May 2003. This programme is supported by the EC 
Delegation in Turkey as a way to create an environment in which local information can 
flourish and cultural initiatives can be undertaken. The difference between the new proposal 
and the Mosaics Program is that the former has criteria requiring a partnership with 
counterparts in at least one (may be more) EU member state for all projects proposals. 
                                                 
103 Information note of European Commission on Civil Society Dialogue, July 25, 2006 
 
104 Ibid. 
 
105 http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/!Publish/tr/DG%20ELARGMEDTQ12-02-          
      AwardNotice-1.doc  
 
106 The European Commission, Civil Society Dialogue: Culture in Action, Guidelines  
      for grant applicants responding to the call for proposals for 2006, Open Call for    
      Proposal 
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The last project is the “Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue: Participation in NGO 
Events in the EU,” which had a deadline of September 30th, 2006. “The objective of the 
programme is to enhance participatory democracy through strengthening the capacity of civil 
initiatives / NGOs in Turkey. The program further aims to promote the development of a Civil 
Society Dialogue through collaboration of NGOs in Turkey with their counterparts in the EU 
and candidate countries by providing financial support to study visits, exchanges and 
attendance of NGO representatives to platforms, meetings and conferences organized on the 
EU level.”107  
  
Projects are announced in the websites of European Commission108 and its 
representation to Turkey,109 Europe Aid,110 as well as such Turkish websites as the Civil 
Society Development Center,111 the Central Finance and Contracts Unit112 and Secretariat 
General for EU Affairs.113 However, there is still a lack of information on the projects being 
opening and project writing, especially at the grass-roots level. 
 
                                                 
107 Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue, Guidelines for grant applicants responding to 
the call for proposals for 2006 
 
108 http://ec.europa.eu/  
 
109 http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int 
 
110 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/index_en.htm 
  
111 http://www.stgm.org.tr 
 
112 http://www.cfcu.gov.tr 
 
113 http://www.abgs.gov.tr  
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There is a planned activity for the promotion of the Civil Society Dialogue between EU 
and Turkey.114  This is an activity supported by the 2006 pre-accession assistance and 
provides €21,5 million to promote the Civil Society Dialogue in Turkey. The target groups 
are: towns and local communities, professional organizations, universities, and youth 
organizations. This program also includes a facility to assist the dialogue by supporting 
interpretation and translation services needed at Civil Society Dialogue events. The Turkish 
government is responsible for the implementation of all projects carried out under this 
program.   
 
Community Programs on education such as Socrates are also targeted and achieved but 
will be elaborated in the next title “National Agency.” 
 
The foreseen funding to civil dialogue for the new period is approximately €75 
million115 which is almost the double of the previous one. However, it is up to the CSOs and 
their abilities to write projects and sustain them, then benefit the funding. 
 
 
 
 
         c. National Agency 
After receiving candidate status at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the door was opened for 
Turkey’s participation in community programs. A framework Convention that made this 
officially possible was signed and put into effect after approval of the Turkish Parliament was 
received on June 2002.  
 
                                                 
114  information note on civil society dialogue  
      also see www.abgs.gov.tr  
 
115 Interview with Ricardo Seri, 2006 
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The European Education and Youth Programs Head Office operates within the State 
Planning Organization Undersecretary. This Head Office became a Center (National Agency), 
independent of the State Planning Organization Undersecretary by a law that became effective 
in August 2003. One year later, with the Agreement Report signed between the Turkish 
Government and the European Union and published in the Official Gazette in May 2004, 
Turkey became the 31st country to participate in the European Union Education and Youth 
Program.   
 
The management of the program was assigned to the National Agency, the 
establishment of which is explained above. “National Agencies are formed in each country as 
implementing and coordinating bodies so as to introduce, coordinate and implement the EU 
Education and Youth Programs nationwide, evaluate those national projects that would 
benefit from the programs, compile applications for and make preliminary evaluations of the 
projects to be selected by the EU Commission, implement the program with the member 
countries and the EU Commission, and maintain relationships with a view towards 
establishing cooperation.”116 The National Agency of Turkey organizes and coordinates three 
programs in which Turkey has been participating: Socrates (General Education), Leonardo Da 
Vinci (Vocational Training) and Youth Programs in Community Programs. There are 
coordination offices under the each programs: Under Socrates, there is Erasmus (for higher 
education program), Comenius (for pre-university formal education – school education), 
Grundtvig, Minerva (for non-formal education, adult education, lifelong education, 
information technologies in education, open-distant education), Lingua and Other Programs 
(European languages education, joint actions, observation and innovation of education 
systems, supplementary measures). Under the Vocational Education (Leonardo da Vinci) 
                                                 
116 Official Website of National Agency  http://www.ua.gov.tr  
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Program there are exchange, language learning, pilot projects, international networks and 
reference materials. Lastly, under the Youth Program, there are youth exchanges and 
European volunteer services, and youth exchanges, joint actions and support measures.  
 
Responsibility for maintaining the budget given to the programs is divided between the 
EU and Turkey, but the greatest share comes from the EU.  
 
Demand and participation in the Erasmus programs (exchange programs for university 
students, and academicians) and youth programs (for bilateral and multilateral programs 
between youth NGOs in Turkey and other countries) have been very high according to the 
yearly figures of the National Agency. 
 
          
         d. The Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey (DELTUR) and               
the European Union Information Center (EUIC)117 
The first body relating the EU opened in Ankara was the “Press and Information Office 
of the European Commission” (1974). This office was changed to the “Representation of the 
European Commission to Turkey” in 1987. It was granted full diplomatic status on the basis 
of an “Agreement on the Establishment of the Representation of the Commission of the 
European Communities in Turkey and on its Immunities and Privileges,” signed in Brussels in 
1987. The name of the Representation of the European Commission to Turkey was changed to 
“The Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey” in July 2004, thus bringing it into 
line with the other Commission Delegations in the world.  
                                                 
117 The related information is taken from the official website of the Delegation of 
European Commission to Turkey, www.deltur.cec.eu.int 
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The delegation represents the European Commission and is a contact point between 
Turkish authorities and European Commission in Brussels. It monitors the developments, 
reforms and their implementation in Turkey and reports it to Brussels. It assists in the 
development of bilateral relations and the programming of financial cooperation between the 
EU and Turkey. The delegation also contributes technically to the dialogue between the EC 
and Turkey through various sub-committees, meetings, etc. The tasks include maintaining a 
regular dialogue with policymakers, opinion leaders and experts on both the government and 
NGO level in the acquis sectors, as well as with the technical services of the Commission.  
 
In the section C of Deltur, there is a sub-committee of Financial Co-operation, 
Institution Building Civil Society (I conducted an interview with the head of unit of this 
committee: Michael Vögele), which organizes the work done in this area.  
 
Another function of the Delegation is to maintain and increase the visibility, 
awareness and understanding of the EU and its values and interests. Based on this purpose 
and as part of the European Commission's Communication Strategy for Turkey project, 
supported by the Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey in relation to the 
enlargement process, “the European Union Information Centre” was opened in Istanbul in 
January 2004. The Center does not have a specific target audience; anyone wanting to receive 
information on EU can apply to it. The center provides several services. It works with EU 
experts who answer the questions coming by e-mail, fax telephone or in person. It holds 
meetings, seminars and cultural activities as well as works as a documentation center (there 
are several centers in Turkey, operation under the name of European Documentation 
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Centers118). It has a large number of publications pertaining to EU-related issues. There are 
also computers there with Internet connection, which enables research to be done on the EU 
databases.  The center is a useful place for CSOs since they can consult experts, attend 
meetings, and use the documents related to their working area, e.g., project writing for EU, 
there. 
 
         e. European Foundation Center 
The EFC is an independent non-profit organization. It is the representative organization 
for foundations at the EU level, monitoring EU policies and representing their interests to 
other institutions. Some cooperation with EU bodies, mainly the Commission, is developed 
within the framework of EFC’s members working in various thematic fields (in addition to 
legal and fiscal monitoring).119  
 
The EFC is a membership organization promoting the work of foundations and 
representing their interests to the EU and international institutions as well as providing its 
members with critical legal and fiscal guidance and knowledge.  Its work with public 
institutions is structured around the interest of its members and is related, for instance, to 
migration and minorities issues; integration of people with disabilities; global health research 
and innovation (with the development of the European Forum on Philanthropy and research 
funding - an initiative with Commission DG research); citizenship; rural development 
international development.120 The EFC, established in 1989 by seven foundations, now has 
                                                 
118http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/default.asp?lang=1&pId=5&fId=3&prnId=3&hnd=1&ord=2&docId=577
&fop=0  
 
119 Based on information asked from Emmanuelle Faure, European Economic and Social 
Committee 
 
         120 Ibid. 
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more than 200 members, associates and subscribers; 350 community philanthropy initiatives; 
as well as a further 50,000 organizations linked through a network of 58 information and 
support centers worldwide. The EFC hosts WINGS (Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker 
Support), a global network of some 100 grantmaker associations and support organizations.121 
 
The EFC currently has four Members from Turkey – the Evkaf Foundation; the Haci 
Ömer Sabanci Foundation – VAKSA; the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TÜSEV); and 
the Vehbi Koç Vakfi (Foundation). Among these, TÜSEV is a board member, as well. As an 
additional note, the 2008 Annual Conference will be held in Istanbul with the cooperation of 
EFC members. Since it is a Governing Board member of the EFC, is on its International 
Committee and participates in other international initiatives through research and reports, 
which were used in preparing this thesis, I would like to focus more on TÜSEV. 
 
TÜSEV (the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey) was established in 1993 by prominent 
businessmen, academicians, and several foundations. It is a private, non-profit foundation set 
up to promote the third sector in Turkey at national and international levels.122 Its main 
purpose is to form a common voluntary platform to be used to stand up against the threats to 
which voluntary organizations, which are indispensable parts of civil society, are subjected.123  
Ergüder notes, in 2002, that TÜSEV assumed important roles in the EU Reform Packages. He 
adds that in the preparations of the provisions of the Civil Code, Associations Law and the by-
law of Foundations Law, TÜSEV has closely worked with lawmakers – a cooperation that is 
continuing.  
                                                 
121 http://www.efc.be  
 
122 European Foundation Centre, Members Profile – Tüsev, Last Updates, April 2006 
 
123 Üstün Ergüder (Director of TÜSEV); “TÜSEV,” Journal of Civil Society,  pp. 92-94 
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There are over 125 foundations that are members of TÜSEV. They may consult for 
issues concerning the legislation, regulation and formation of their organizations. TÜSEV also 
makes them aware of the changes in the legislation and issues announcements on several 
issues that would concern them. It translates into Turkish EU documents that would be of 
benefit to foundations. It holds seminars, conferences and meetings regarding third sector 
development. TÜSEV releases several reports mainly on the legislative issues and conducts 
research on a number of issues (such as philanthropy in Turkey).      
 
TÜSEV is member of or cooperates with several institutions such as the World Alliance 
for Civil Participation (CIVICUS), Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker Support (WINGS), 
and the European Foundation Center, as stated before. They organize common projects and 
research. As it is related to my study, and since TÜSEV is a member, I will focus on 
CIVICUS.   
 
“CIVICUS is an international alliance of an estimated 1000 members in about 100 
countries that has worked for over a decade to strengthen citizen action and civil society 
throughout the world, especially in areas where participatory democracy and citizens' freedom 
of association are threatened.”124 Among its activities, it has the Civil Society Index (CSI) 
Program, which uses an action-research methodology to assess the state of civil society in 
countries around the world, creating a knowledge base and impetus for initiatives to 
strengthen civil society. The CSI was launched by CIVICUS as a pilot project in 2000, and 
uses a unique, participatory methodology to assess the structure, impact, values and 
                                                 
124 www.civicus.org/new/default.asp?skip2=yes  
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environment of civil society at the national level. The CSI is currently applied by CIVICUS 
and its national partner organizations in more than 50 countries.125  
 
In Turkey, TÜSEV assumed responsibility for the application of the CSI (STEP126 in 
Turkish) program in co-operation with CIVICUS. TÜSEV started its preparations in 2004 and 
its research activities in 2005.  On December 3-5, 2005, the STEP Civil Society National 
Forum was held in order to inform the CSOs invited to the Forum of the early outcomes of the 
Turkish case. Finally, on December 19th, the final STEP research results were announced at a 
press conference. Some of STEP findings will be used in later chapters.   
 
Based on previous explanations, I would say that TÜSEV has a crucial role in helping to 
instill civil society values in Turkish society; it establishes connections with its European 
counterparts and enables cooperation between the CSOs in Turkey.   
 
 
 
 
         f. Euro-Mediterranean Partnership / Barcelona Process 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euro-Med or EMD) is an example of regional 
cooperation having a “wide framework of political, economic and social relations between the 
Member States of the European Union and Partners of the Southern Mediterranean.”127 The 
foundation goes back to the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
held in Barcelona on November 27-28, 1995. In 1995, the signatories to the Barcelona 
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126 http://www.step.org.tr/  
  
127 The European Commission, External Policies 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/index.htm 
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Declarations were the EU’s 15 member states and 12 partners of the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian 
Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). The number is now 37, with 27 consisting of EU 
member states and 10 being Mediterranean partners.  
In the Barcelona Declaration, the Euro-Med partners established the three main 
objectives of the Partnership:128 
1. The definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of 
political and security dialogue (Political and Security Chapter). 
2. The construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial 
partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area (Economic and Financial 
Chapter). 
3. The rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership 
aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil 
societies (Social, Cultural and Human Chapter). 
 
Based on the third objective, the Euro-Med Non-Governmental Platform was 
established in February 2003 as an inclusive and open-ended group of active civil society 
networks and organizations that are independent of public authorities.129  
 The Platform has two main objectives: 
• To reinforce the implication of civil society in the Barcelona Process and in all policies 
and mechanisms of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
• To promote the recognition of civil society as a key interlocutor in the countries of the 
region and in the framework of the EMP and new neighborhood policies 
The EuroMed Non-Governmental Platform gathers regional, sub-regional, national and 
local networks and organizations from the EuroMed region. They represent a diverse range of 
                                                 
128 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Assessment of the Barcelona Process, 
Working Paper of European Parliament 
         129 The EuroMed Non-Governmental Platform    http://www.euromedplatform.org 
   68
civil society interests, including the environment, trade unions, human rights, development, 
transparency, culture, women and youth.  
There are 88 organizations (and additionally, four individuals) forming the Platform 
(2006 figures). Among them, the organizations related to Turkey are the Human Rights 
Association (Turkey based) and L’Assemblée Citoyenne des Originaires de Turquie 
(ACORT, France based). 
Starting in 2007, the first Euro-Mediterranean Youth Parliament130 will hold meetings 
with the young participants of members of several CSOs from all over the Euro-Med 
countries, of which this researcher will be a participant from Turkey. Involving young persons 
in Euro-Med is a very positive step taken within the framework of promoting civil society. 
  As I have attended several Euro-Med meetings (parliamentary assembly), talked with 
the director of Euro-Med Non-Governmental Platform131 and attended several meetings that 
CSOs have organized internationally, I would say that while the EMD Non-Governmental 
Platform has begun to acquire an important position and weight. However, because the power 
of a branch is also affected by the power of its center; this platform is highly affected by the 
relative weakness of the EMD itself. Though there is growing dialogue and cooperation in the 
EMD, it still remains weak and not at the level initially hoped for.  
                                                 
130 The German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Goethe-Institut and the Heinz Schwarzkopf  
Foundation, in cooperation with the European Commission and the Anna Lindh Foundation, 
during the German EU Council Presidency 
131 Interview with José Moisés Martín Carretero, director of Euro-Med Non-Governmental 
Platform, 2006 
   69
Euro-Med has developed two programs: one national and the other regional.132 The 
budget for both is allocated from the EU. The lion’s share of the budget goes to MEDA 
programs (the 1995-1999 budget was 4.6 million Euro, with MEDA being given 3.4 Million 
Euro; between 2000-2006, MEDA was allocated 5,350 Million Euro). “86 % of MEDA’s 
financial resources are spent on national programs, mainly in nine countries, including 
Turkey. The remaining 12 % (with 2 % going to technical assistance offices) is open to all the 
countries for regional programs (activities must be held with at least two EU member states 
and two Mediterranean countries).” 
Civil society organizations in Turkey benefit from MEDA133 in different categories 
(e.g., Euro-Med Youth, which is directed by the National Agency in Turkey).   
 
 
 
         C.  European Economic and Social Committee 
 
The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) is a consultative body that 
offers opinions to the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament.  “The 
consultation given by the EESC is mandatory for the issues stipulated in the Treaties, but the 
Committee is also increasingly being asked to draw up explanatory opinions before proposals 
are adopted or political decisions are taken. It can also issue opinions and draw up 
information reports on its own initiative.”134 These reports and opinions may concern Turkey 
as well.135 
                                                 
132 Middle East Technical University EU Office  http://www.abofisi.metu.edu.tr  
 
133 Also see the next chapter “Funding.” 
134 Anne-Marie Sigmund, President of EESC, Brochure of EESC: A Bridge between 
Europe and Organized Civil Society  
135 Such examples are:                                                                                                             
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There are three groups inside EESC. They gather representatives related to the area of 
the group. The first is the Employers group, which brings representatives of private and public 
sectors of industry, small businesses, chambers of commerce, wholesale and real trade, 
banking and insurance, transportation and agriculture. The second group is the Employees 
Group, which is made up of members with a background in national trade union 
organizations, both confederations and sectoral federations. The third group consists of 
various interest groups. The composition of the European Economic and Social Committee 
reflects the changing face of European society. The presence of the Various Interests Group, 
alongside the Employers Group and the Employees Group, it ensures that the Committee is 
able to give full voice to the concerns of the various social, occupational, economic and 
cultural organizations that make up civil society. A wide range of categories is represented 
within the third group: farmers organizations, small businesses, the crafts sector, the 
professions, cooperatives and non-profit associations, consumer organizations, environmental 
organizations, associations representing the family, persons with disabilities, the scientific and 
academic community and non-governmental organizations.  
 
There are several sections inside EESC. One of these is the External Relations (REX) 
section. Within REX, Turkey is involved with Joint Consultative Committees (JCC).  
 
The EU-Turkey JCC is a joint body that brings together representatives of organized 
civil society of the EU and Turkey. The EU-Turkey JCC members come from various CSOs: 
                                                                                                                                                        
The Opinion of EESC on Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Candidate 
Countries, 26-27 October 2005, Brussels   
Opinion of EESC on EU-Turkey Relations with a view to the European Council of 
December 2004 (own-initiative opinion), 1 July 2004, Brussels                                    
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Chambers of commerce and industry, employer associations, trade unions, cooperatives, 
chamber of agriculture, consumer associations, NGOs and so on.136 The JCC was formed in 
1995 to promote dialogue and cooperation between economic and social interest groups from 
both sides. It contributes to the dialogue between civil societies, and assumes organizing 
specific initiatives to develop this further.137  
 
There are fifteen members from each side forming the JCC. Several organizations 
represented from the Turkish side: TOBB, TİSK, TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ, DİSK, KAMU-SEN, 
TZOB, TESK, TÜSİAD and such institutions. There are two chairs; one representing EESC, 
the other representing Turkey. Turkey’s co-chair is selected for a two-year period. The present 
co-chair of Turkey is Şemsi Bayraktar, while EESC’s co-chair is Bryan Cassidy.   
 
The JCC meets twice a year, once in Turkey and then in Brussels (it may rarely change 
to another city in the EU).  These meetings form a kind of platform to exchange views. 
References both to the developments in Turkey in the accession process and the acts of EU 
Institutions are discussed while giving the necessary steps that both parts should take. 
Meetings are enriched by working papers on various issues prepared and presented by experts 
from different institutions or the members of JCC itself. The agenda of the JCC is also figured 
in respect to the developments in the EU-Turkey relations in the time the meeting is held.  At 
nearly every meeting, a reference is made to the Turkish Economic and Social Council 
(formed in 1995 like the JCC, it gathers social partners under one umbrella) where it is 
requested that it be strengthened and given weight in policy making. Suggestions to the 
Turkish government to consult this council and take its opinions into serious consideration are 
                                                 
136 Joint Declaration, JCC Meeting, 30 November 2004, Hague 
137 Civil Society Dialogue, 2005 
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being made. Various issues like research and development (11th JCC Meeting, April 18-19, 
2001 Ankara), social dialogue and social rights (12th JCC Meeting, November 5-6, 2001 
Brussels), economic crisis and migration (13th JCC Meeting, July 12, 2002 Erzurum), 
common agriculture policy and efficient market economy (14th JCC Meeting, November 28-
29, 2002 Brussels), the market economy and regional disparities (15th JCC Meeting, April 7-
8, 2003 Istanbul), the sixth framework program (16th JCC Meeting, November 3-4, 2003 
Brussels), disabilities and micro/small enterprises (17th JCC Meeting, May 27-28, 2004 
Denizli; 18th JCC Meeting, November 29-30, 2004 Hague), involving civil society in 
Turkey’s accession negotiation process (19th JCC Meeting, July 7-8, 2005 Istanbul), and civil 
society dialogue and trade union rights (20th JCC Meeting, November 28-29, 2005 Brussels),  
women and employment, Lisbon strategy, rural development, and involving civil society in 
Turkey’s accession negotiation process (21st JCC Meeting, July 13-14, 2006 Kayseri) and 
finally trade union rights, visa procedures, actual stand of negotiations and the role of 
organized civil society (22nd JCC Meeting, March 1-2, 2007) are being discussed at the JCC 
Meetings. 
 
 
3. FUNDING138 
 
The seeds of financial assistance from the European Community to Turkey were sewn 
long ago, with the Ankara Agreement of 1963. Turkey has been given grants from the EU 
budget and loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB) since then. At the conclusion of 
the Ankara Agreement, an association regime was mutually agreed upon. Under this regime, 
three separate financial protocols designed to encourage social and economic development in 
                                                 
138 This information is available on the website of the Representation of European 
Commission to Turkey, www.deltur.gov.tr  
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Turkey were signed from 1964 to 1981. Turkey benefited from financial support at a level of 
752 million Euros during this period. Of this total, 115 million Euros came from EIB loans, 
with 637 million Euros consisting of Community loans.  
• First Protocol (1964-1969): Community loans for 175 million Euro;  
• Second Protocol (1973-1976): EIB loans for 195 million Euro;  
• Third Protocol (1979-1981): Loans of 310 million Euro (Community loan for 220 
million Euro and EIB loan for 90 million Euro)  
 
Neither these protocols nor several other sources of funds later on included assistance to 
Civil Society Organizations. The first of the funds for direct assistance to CSOs did not come 
until in 1993, when the Commission allocated financial support under various budget lines to 
many Turkish non-governmental organizations working to promote democracy, human rights 
and civil society. Since 1993 NGOs in Turkey have received grants averaging 500,000 Euros.  
 
Subsequent assistance came from the MEDA I Program, initiated under the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership.139 The European Commission allocated 4.6 million Euros from its 
budget for the 1995-99 periods to facilitate financial cooperation between the EU and its 
Mediterranean Partners. Of this total, 3.4 million Euros were committed within the framework 
of the MEDA I Program, the main financial tool of the Partnership, which corresponded to 55 
projects. National and regional policies formulated to benefit from the MEDA I Program were 
developed.140 These donations from the European Commission were supported by long-term 
                                                 
139 Further information is given on the previous title Euro-Med. 
 
140 MEDA I Program: Bilateral and Regional Cooperation: The MEDA Program is the 
basic financial aid mechanism in implementation of the European-Mediterranean 
Partnership. Turkey, as a member of the Partnership, has been eligible for the EU 
resources since 1996. The total of financial support in the pre-Helsinki period reached 
376 million Euros. As of the end of 1999, the entire amount of this allocation had been 
committed to bilateral projects aiming at economic consistency, social-economic 
development, democratization and reinforcement. Besides bilateral cooperation, Turkey 
benefits from various regional programs such as the Cultural Heritage Program, the 
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loans provided within the framework of the European Investment Bank's Partnership.141 
Included among the beneficiaries of this program were Turkish NGOs.142  
Since acquiring candidacy status, Turkey has been eligible to join community programs 
and receive financial assistance under the pre-accession program. This both formalized and 
systematized assistance to Turkey. On December 17, 2001, the Council adopted regulations 
concerning pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey determining a certain amount of 
annually assistance, which was increased with the Commission’s Strategy Paper of 2002.The 
pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey is as follows: 
Table 1 
Pre-accession Assistance 
   2004  2005  2006  Total  
Pre-
accession 
financial 
assistance 
for 
Turkey  
€million, 
current 
prices  
250  300  500  1050  
                Source: Central Finance and Contracts Unit 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Youth Action Program, the Audio-Visual Cooperation Program, EUMEDIS and SMAP.  
Source: Representation of European Commission to Turkey 
 
141 A total of 2.3 million Euros was allocated to the Partnership during the 1997-2000 
period. 
 
142 Grigoriadis, 2005 
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All the budgeting, tendering, contracting, payments, accounting and financial reporting 
aspects of all procurement in the context of the EU-funded programs in Turkey is the 
responsibility of the Central Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU), which operates as an 
independent body attached to the EU Secretariat General and the National Aid 
Coordinator.143 The CFCU was established by the Memorandum of Understanding, 
which was signed between the EU Commission and the Turkish Government on 
February 14th, 2002, and subsequently ratified by the Grand National Assembly on 
January 29th, 2003. 
There is a project called “Improving Cooperation between the NGOs and the Public 
Sector and Strengthening the NGOs’ Democratic Participation Level (SKIP in Turkish),”144 
which has a budget of € 2 million. The deadline for proposals was August 11th, 2005. The 
technical management of the project was given to Secretariat General for European Union 
Affairs145 (EUSG). Included as part of the Contracting Authority are the Central Finance and 
                                                 
143 http://www.cfcu.gov.tr/ 
 
144 The project is translated into Turkish under a website http://www.skip.org.tr/  
 
145  EUSG is founded in 2000 under the Prime Ministry. Its objective is in conformity 
with plans and programs, channel and shoulders the internal coordination of the 
preparations and the harmonization work to be carried out by the Turkish public 
organizations and agencies within the framework of efforts to prepare Turkey for full 
membership in the EU (article 1 of its by-law) coordinating, in conformity with plans 
and programs, internal efforts of harmonization to be carried out by the Turkish public 
organizations and agencies; 
b) Providing secretarial services to the boards and committees which shall be established 
with a view to preparing Turkey for membership in the EU, and guiding the 
implementation of the decisions of the said boards and committees; c) conducting 
required research and studies in line with the decisions of the Government and the 
boards and committees to be established; 
d) Awarding, by contract and in areas of its competence, to natural and legal persons 
both within Turkey and abroad the tasks of making studies, research and translations; 
 e) Issuing, through the Prime Ministry, regulations, communications, circulars and 
other similar regulatory instruments concerning the services that it is responsible to 
render. (Article 2 of its by-law) 
Source: http://www.abgs.gov.tr  
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Contracts Unit (CFCU). The project has two main components: technical assistance and the 
facilitation of grants. The aim of the technical assistance component was developing strategies 
to improve the cooperation between the civil society and the public sector. Accordingly, it is 
to identify necessary regulatory changes, promote good practices, prepare a Code of Conduct, 
build the capacity of relevant actors and raise awareness on the benefits and successful 
models for cooperation between NGOs and the public sector. The second component is 
facilitating grants in support of pilot projects aimed at strengthening  
NGO-public sector cooperation within the framework of the EU alignment process. The 
overall objective of this program is to contribute to the development of a structured dialogue 
and effective and sustainable forms of cooperation between civil society and public sector in 
Turkey.146   
 
One of the most important and comprehensive programs initiated by the Commission to 
support the CSOs has been the “Civil Society Program.” This program was designed for two 
years with a total budget of €8 million.  
The general objective is to reinforce civil society in Turkey, to develop capacity 
for citizens' initiatives and dialogue, domestically and abroad, and to help 
establish a more balanced relationship between citizens and the state, thereby 
contributing to the maturing of democratic practice. The program aims to 
stimulate citizen initiatives in all parts of the country and generally enhance NGO 
professional and management capacity, to strengthen NGO capacity for dialogue, 
networking and partnership projects within Turkey and with opposite numbers in 
Greece and other parts of the EU. The program has six components:  
 
Component 1: Local Civic Initiatives: The proliferation of successful NGO 
initiatives and cooperation, improved management skills and increased capacity 
among NGOs and greater public awareness of the potential role of civil society in 
Turkey.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
146 Guideline for applicants, “Improving Co-operation between the NGOs and the Public 
Sector and Strengthening the NGOs’ Democratic Participation Level,” Contracting 
Authority is Central Finance and Contracts Unit. 
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Component 2: Turkey-Greece Civic Dialogue: The proliferation of dialogue 
activity, a sustainable level of mutual knowledge and interest, and the 
dissemination of know-how.  
 
Component 3: Local Government Partnerships: This component will result in a 
number of successful ‘demonstration’ projects on exchanges and dissemination of 
know-how on benefits and mechanisms of EU-Turkey municipal exchanges. 
 
Component 4: Dialogue and Development of Chambers: This component will 
result in a number of successful ‘demonstration’ projects on exchanges and 
dissemination of know-how, including a quality control system, within and by the 
milieus concerned. 
 
Component 5: Trade Union Dialogue: This component will result in the 
establishment of the National Integration. Commission NTUCEI as a tool to 
create and sustain a more harmonious relationship among the Trade Union 
confederations in Turkey, and between them and their EU counterparts. The 
Turkish Trade Union confederations will be informed of the role and behavior of 
Trade Unions in the Member States on matters concerning European economic 
and social integration.   
 
Component 6: Police Professionalism and the Public: The programme will result 
in new skills by police trainers and police at various levels following adjustments 
in the basic curriculum and in the training methodology, including the 
introduction of a specific component ‘policing in a democratic society’ 
concerning ethics, behaviour and relations with the public.147 
A six-member team for managing the civil society development program was organized 
and directed by Sunay Demircan. Besides helping the CSOs who would like to contribute to 
the projects specified in the components, this team organized several training seminars for 
CSOs in a number of cities and set up a website for CSOs to keep them abreast of issues.  
After having successfully completed this program, to serve as a continuation of civil 
initiatives supported by the funds of European Commission,148 the “Civil Society 
Development Center (STGM)” was founded by nine persons and led by Sunay Demircan, as 
was the case with the CSDP.  
                                                 
147 EU Funded Programmes in Turkey 2002-2003 and 2003-2004, The Delegation of 
European Commission to Turkey (The total two-year term budget of the Civil Society 
Development Project carried out by the Civil Society Development Center and 
supported by the European Commission was 1,820,000 Euro). 
 
148 www.stgm.org.tr  
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STGM tries to help the work of CSOs while keeping them informed of a number of 
issues. It holds training seminars and provides assistance in the form of information to 
projects. Their website provides announcements of the activities of the CSOs, which 
facilitates coordination and awareness between them and projects. It also provides 
information on the provision of EU funds. Guides for civil society and projects are currently 
being planned. It performs comprehensive mapping analyses that provide a picture of the 
NGOs situation, problems and other issues. Such a study of STGM that is held in 8 provinces 
with at least 32 NGOs will be examined in another section.  
Project writing and efforts to keep track of EU developments in the arena of civil society 
would be extremely difficult for CSOs, especially the small, grassroots ones working in every 
area. Institutions like the CSDC may help the CSOs by serving as consultative bodies, but the 
problem is still widespread. Turkish CSOs are at the beginning of a learning process. This was 
pronounced recently by a number of women NGOs. 58 women NGOs in Turkey wrote a letter 
to the EU authorities in Brussels and Ankara criticizing them for the difficulty and time-
consuming procedures that exist for seeking grants from the EU. They have stated that this is 
valid for all kinds and amounts of funds, something that keeps women NGOs, especially the 
small grassroots ones, from benefiting from the funds. The reply of the Commission pointed 
to the principles of the funding such as transparency and accountability.  
Women NGOs have developed exponentially, especially in recent years. They have 
influenced and successfully changed the articles of the new Civil Code (the 2002 changes) 
and the Penalty Code (the 2004 changes) concerning women’s rights and the crimes 
committed against women.149 They have been able to work together to achieve such common 
goals as the establishment of women’s platform, which lobbied the EU for support in getting 
                                                 
149 Here, some data are derived from a conversation held with Aysun Sayın, Kadiger 
(Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey) 
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changes made to the abovementioned codes. They have been members of the European 
Women’s Lobby and opened the European Women’s Lobby Turkish National Coordination 
Committee. They have raised the awareness of women’s issues in the Turkish public. They 
have worked to increase press coverage of women-related news. They have interacted with 
the EU not only with the recent letter mentioned, but also with the funds allocated for gender 
equality. Women NGOs have supported the cause of women by forming projects such as 
those that work to fight violence against women and to promote female entrepreneurship and 
the participation of women in economic life. 
 
In spite of the obstacles faced in the learning process, Turkish CSOs have been 
increasingly benefiting from the EU funds. On the ground of funding, Kaya150 asserts that, 
there is a clientilist relationship between the CSOs and the EU Institutions, of which the EU 
creates funds with several topics and the CSOs are the customers of these funds. But 
regardless of the type of relationship, the positive impact of this funding cannot be ignored. 
The contribution to Turkish CSOs is not only in financial terms; it is also achieved through 
bringing about cooperation (projects may require partnerships with other organizations in 
order to benefit from the funding), motivation for activities, specialization, gaining trust and 
support.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
150 Ayhan Kaya (presentation together with Ahmet İçduygu); “Civil Society and 
Turkey’s Europeanization Process: Towards a Differentiated Analysis,” in Symposium 
“Europeanization and Transformation: Turkey in the Post-Helsinki Era,” 2-3 December 
2005, Koç University 
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         4. Lobbying in Brussels 
 
 
The term “lobbyist” is said to have been created by the former president of the United 
States Ulysses S. Grant (1869-1877). He used to go to the lobby of the Willard Hotel near the 
White House to smoke his cigar and drink brandy to relax. People learned about this and 
started coming to the lobby to tell him their problems. The president called these people who 
tried to persuade him “lobbyists.”151       
Brussels is an enormous magnet attracting all sectors. Since it hosts EU institutions and 
NATO, Brussels is a central place where many firms and lobbyists can be found. Turkish 
CSOs are also aware of this fact and are able to conduct effective lobbying there. Participating 
in the conferences held in Brussels and making contacts at the EU level are important support-
getting tools. Recently, through the initiatives of the Turkish CSOs and several individuals, 
after six years of effort and effective lobbying, Istanbul was chosen, among many other 
candidates, as the European Capital of Culture for 2010. In the decision announced by the EU, 
the civilian structure of the Turkish Initiative Group152 was stressed as one of the crucial 
reasons for selecting Istanbul. This shows the growing impact and visibility of Turkish CSOs 
in Brussels. In addition to spontaneous initiatives and contacts, there are several Turkish CSO 
representations in Brussels. There are also CSOs founded by Turkish immigrants. Even 
though the focus of this study is the Turkish CSO’s representations, a brief description of the 
CSOs formed by the immigrants would be useful. 
                                                 
151 Bahadır Kaleağası (Representative of TÜSİAD Brussels); Power Sources of        
     Lobbies, www.abhaber.com    
     
152 Istanbul European Capital of Culture, http://www.istanbul2010.org.tr  
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The history of Turks in EU countries goes back more than 40 years. Immigration began 
with the invitation of host countries, including Holland, Belgium, Germany. Because of a 
need for workers in several sectors, such as iron-steel and mining, on July 16th, 1964, the 
Belgium Government signed a treaty pertaining to the employment of Turkish workers in 
Belgium. Massive migrations of Turks occurred all over Europe, mainly in Germany, during 
the 1960s and 1970s. 1973 figures from Belgium put the number of Turkish migrants there at 
14,029.153 However, following the unification of families, the tendency of Turks to stay in 
host countries rather than return to Turkey (due to such reasons as economic crisis in Turkey), 
and additional migration, this number had grown to 160,000 Turks (with 120,000 having 
acquired Belgium citizenship) by 2005.154 It is estimated that there are 3.86 million Turks 
living in the EU – the largest group of immigrants there.155 
   
It is generally agreed that immigration results in individuals identifying more with 
values, identity and religion. This is also valid for EuroTurks (T. Küçükcan and V. Güngör 
referred this term, 2006). Moreover, for a long time, they were basically ignored by both the 
home and host countries. Since they were not seen as permanent in the first place, but only as 
temporary workers, no integration policies existed. This enhanced feelings of isolation and 
alienation, which forced Turks into small, self-sufficient Turkish communities. In terms of 
distribution, it can clearly be seen that the population of Turks in specific host countries came 
from particular areas of Turkey. For example, Turks from the “Emirdağ” region of Afyon are 
                                                 
153 Talip Küçükcan and Veysi Güngör, EuroTurks and Turkey-EU Relations: The Dutch 
Case, Türkevi Research Center, Amsterdam 2006. 
 
154 Turks in Belgium, Embassy of the Turkish Republic in Brussels, 
http://www.turkey.be/prod02.htm  
 
155 “The European Turks: Gross Domestic Product, Working Population, Entrepreneurs 
and Household Data,” Centre for Studies on Turkey, Essen 2003. This research would 
be obtained from TÜSİAD’s website. 
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mostly situated in Belgium. Associations formed during the early decades are all based on 
primordial ties. Associations for solidarity (both in the regional and religious base) were very 
common early on. Their focus was more on resisting assimilation and preserving their own 
culture and values. Additionally, they were separated ideologically. Their agenda was 
preoccupied with Turkey’s agenda. After conditions and perceptions of them changed (i.e., 
once they stopped being seen and stopped seeing themselves as temporary; changing 
economic conditions, rising levels of education; the formation of a merchant class so on and 
so forth), the structuring and themes of the CSOs started to change as well. Ideological 
cleavages have left themselves to a greater focus on the individual, with individuals becoming 
more enthusiastic about cooperating. Their agenda has shifted away from Turkey to that of the 
host countries. Moreover, there has been a move away from a concern with how to not 
assimilate to how to integrate better and raise the standards of Turks. But these are not valid 
for all the CSOs. There is still a great number of “solidarity organizations.”156 In addition, 
these developments do not mean that CSOs have become detached from their Turkish roots 
completely. According to a research study based on questionnaires, they feel more like hybrid 
organizations, i.e., simultaneously Turkish and Belgium/Dutch.157  Also they have also 
concentrated their efforts on changing the image of Turkey in Europe and contributing to the 
perspective of Turkey-EU Relations.  
With the rise of the merchant class, we see that the Turkish population in Brussels has 
increased efforts to form business organizations, which have had successful results working 
with a number of CSOs.  
                                                 
156 Please see the list of the associations in Brussels and Antwerp, registered to Turkish 
Consulates in Belgium.  http://www.turk-konsolos.com/go.php?page=87&lang=3 , 
http://www.turk-konsolos.com/go.php?page=83&lang=3  Note: Registration is not 
obligatory; these are the ones who registered voluntarily.  
 
157 Veyis Güngör; Hello to 2006 with Dutch Writers’ Club, 15.02.2006, 
http://www.postgazetesi.com/c/ho.asp?id=5744  
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         A. Turkish CSOs Representations in Brussels 
There are several representations of Turkish CSOs in Brussels. These are deeply rooted, 
effective and well-known organizations. Their institutional existence in Brussels - the so-
called capital of the EU, has emerged mainly in the last two decades. But this does not mean 
that their studies of and interactions with the EU are novel. On the contrary, they have existed 
in EU for a long time. Those representatives established more recently are probably the result 
of a clarification of EU-Turkey relations, the transformation of EU itself and a growing 
awareness of policy-making in Brussels. While there are exceptions, business-oriented 
organizations are in the majority. They are mostly members of the European equivalents, such 
as Unice, Eurochambers, Iglo, and Eurotex. This makes them better able to make their voice 
heard and be represented throughout Europe. This also gives them the opportunity to be 
represented in Coneccs (elaborated in the previous headings of this study), even though none 
of the Turkish CSOs is on the list of Coneccs by itself.  
  
The representations of Turkish business organizations have cordial relations with each 
other. They may come together at meetings and exchange views. Since 2005, they have also 
held regular meetings (Brussels Civil Society and Business World Representatives Meeting-
STİD in Turkish) under the chairmanship of Ambassador Mr. Volkan Bozkır, of the 
Permanent Representation of Turkey to the EU. Several meetings have been held so far to 
enable the flow of information and to manage coordination between them.   
 
Turkish CSOs have good bilateral relations with EU Institutions. They establish contacts 
and also facilitate the accurate flow of information flow in their working area.  
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As CSOs publications/websites are one of the key sources on specific areas like 
industry, their research and efforts cannot be ignored.158  
  
After having provided brief information, I would like to discuss individual CSOs in 
more detail. My main focus will be on business-oriented organizations due to their dominance 
in the area. My study samples will be the IKV, TUSIAD, TOBB, ITKIB and TUR-BO. I will 
focus on their formation and activities in both Turkey and Brussels. 
 
        a. IKV (Economic Development Foundation)159 
The IKV’s history is as old as the history of EU-Turkey relations. After the signing of 
Ankara Agreement in 1965, the IKV started preparations for its establishment. It was founded 
in 1965 to monitor and evaluate Turkey-EU relations, to inform the public and to represent 
the Turkish business world to EU. Its founding members are two important social partners in 
Turkey - the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ISO) and the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce 
(ITO). The IKV has increased the number of its trustees and supporters since its foundation. 
Its current trustee institutions are the Union of Chambers and Stock Exchanges of Turkey 
(TOBB), the Union of Textile and Apparel Exporters of Istanbul (ITKIB), the Turkish 
Exporters Assembly (TIM), the Union of Agricultural Chambers of Turkey (TZOB), the 
Aegean Region Chambers of Industry (EBSO), the Istanbul Commodity Exchange (ITB), the 
                                                 
158 In a survey, members of European parliament are asked to identify their key sources 
for industry. The responses were as follows: 31 % industry newsletters, 28 % industry 
position papers, 27 % the Financial Times, 13 % NGO publications/websites, 12 % EU 
press releases, 12 % non-specific newspapers, 11 % publications by trade 
unions/organizations, 8 % the Wall Street Journal. “MEP’s Mixed Response to Industry 
Lobbying,” A Guide to Effective Lobbying of the European Parliament (Based on a 
survey of MEPs Autumn 2001), Burson-Marstteller, Government Relations Worldwide, 
2001. 
159 The technical information is based on IKV’s official website (www.ikv.org.tr) and 
IKV’s Booklet for the 40th year anniversary of its foundation. 
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Izmir Commodity Exchange, the Izmir Chamber of Commerce, the Union of Banks of Turkey 
(TBB), the Confederation of Employers’ Union of Turkey (TISK) and the Turkish 
Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD). IKV receives financial and other 
kinds of support from several foundations and companies.160 It has 17 board members and two 
auditors, who are chosen every two years, on its board of directors.161  
 
The IKV has adapted itself to evolving developments in Turkey–EU Relations.  
 
 The main objectives of the IKV are: 
 Contributing to the economic and social development of Turkey 
 
 Facilitating what needs to be done to develop the relations of Turkey with the other 
countries and especially with the EU. 
 
 Organizing seminars, conferences, panels and related meetings for informing the 
Turkish Public; to release research prepared by the IKV itself or by expertise institutions 
asked by IKV to do so. 
 
 Enabling cooperation and coordination among the business world both domestically and 
in abroad; to form the basic views towards Turkey-EU relations while encouraging 
corporation and exchange of views/information with all the related public and private 
sector institutions. 
 
 Constantly following the developments in EU and informing the public by evaluating 
the effects of these on Turkey. 
 
 Promoting Turkey abroad.162   
 
 Facilitating facilitate and accelerating Turkey’s EU membership process. 
 
 Ensuring active participation of the Turkish business world and civil society in this 
process.163 
                                                 
160 The total number of supporters from different sectors is 65 according to the IKV’s 
website; For the list, see http://www.ikv.org.tr/destekleyenler.php 
 
161 The IKV’s Booklet, 2005  
 
162 About the IKV, http://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.php  
 
163 The IKV’s Booklet for the 40th Anniversary of its Foundation, 2005  
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In order to achieve these goals, the IKV conducts the following kinds of activities: 
 
• Organizes seminars, conferences and panels to inform mainly the public and private 
sectors and the public as well: the IKV holds these both in Turkey and EU countries 
with the assistance of experts from Turkey and the EU. 
 
• Conducts comprehensive research and issues publications: IKV has released nearly 550 
publications so far on many aspects of EU and Turkey-EU relations. It also has been 
publishing periodicals, bulletins, and almanacs. 
 
• Carries out projects that contribute to the integration Turkey-EU process: These projects 
are in different areas. One is for enhancing inter-firm cooperation. The IKV, with the 
support and cooperation of the European Commission, facilitates the representation of 
Turkey in many programs developing inter-SMEs relations in many areas, including 
research and development (e.g., Europartenariat, Europartner, Medpartenariat, 
Enterprise, Business Partnerships). The İKV is the only institution out of institutions 
from 80 countries that has been selected as the most successful “National 
Representative” in the concerned programs for 5 years in a row. Another project in 
which the IKV has been involved is in the area of education and information whereby 
support for the EU in the Turkish public and business sector is enhanced by making 
more information available to them. 
 
• Develops key positions and recommendations: the IKV watches developments in the EU 
and in Turkey-EU relations. It then develops several positions and formulates 
recommendations in the name of the Turkish private sector. While developing these 
positions, the IKV is always in dialog and exchanges information with the public and 
private sectors. The IKV presents reports and strategies to the government. These are 
prepared especially during the candidacy period. It also gives briefings at high-level 
institutions of the state.         
 
• Facilitates the task of promoting Turkey within the EU by cooperating with several local 
and foreign persons and institutions, and promoting the EU to the Turkish private sector 
and public.  
 
• Maintains the results of research. The IKV has the oldest EU library in Turkey. This 
library not only contains the research of the IKV but other institutions, international 
organizations, chambers as well. 
 
• Coordinates, promotes and lobbies: The IKV opened its branch in Brussels in the early 
1980s. IKV Brussels conducts promotional activities for Turkey both at the level of 
member states and in EU Institutions. It releases several regular reports, publications on 
the Turkey-EU process, which it sends to foreign media representatives, European 
NGOs, EU institutions and elsewhere; it contributes to several meetings in the member 
states, invites their authorities and media staff to Turkey. It lobbies through bilateral 
contacts with EU Institutions.  
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The IKV has undertaken the task of coordinating the “Turkey Platform,”164 which is 
composed of over 250 CSOs from different areas. This platform does not meet regularly but 
rather only when the platform feels it is necessary. It carries out communication, promotion 
and lobbying campaigns, and indicates its position or offers its support to the government on 
the EU process. At the EU level, it sends messages via meetings and their declarations. At the 
initial meetings, the platform asked the government to continue with the reforms. Then, in 
Brussels, two years before the negotiations actually started, it pointed out the reforms Turkey 
had already undertaken and asked for support. Also, almost 300 CSOs representatives came to 
Brussels with the support of the IKV and the TOBB under the Platform to meet their EU 
equivalents.             
 
         b. TÜSİAD 
TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) was founded in 1971 
by a group of leading industrialists primarily to defend the interests of the private sector. It is 
a non-governmental, voluntary-based (in the sense that membership is not compulsory but the 
association has the right to accept or reject application of membership) association.  
TÜSİAD is committed to the universal principles of democracy and human rights, 
together with the freedoms of enterprise, belief and opinion, it seeks to promote 
the development of a social structure which conforms to Ataturk's principles and 
reforms, and strives to fortify the concept of a democratic civil society and a 
secular state of law in Turkey. It believes that the industrialists and other business 
people should assume a leading role in Turkish society and encourages its 
members to act on this conviction. TÜSİAD aims to establish the legal and 
institutional framework of a market economy and to ensure the application of 
internationally accepted business ethics. It supports policies aimed at establishing 
a liberal economic system. It believes in and works for the idea of integration 
within the international economic system, by increasing the competitiveness of the 
Turkish industrial and services sectors, thereby assuring itself of a well-defined 
and permanent place in the economic arena. It supports all policies aimed at the 
establishment of a liberal economic system which uses human and natural 
resources more efficiently by means of the latest technological innovations and 
which tries to create proper conditions for a permanent increase in productivity 
                                                 
164 Interview with Haluk Nuray, İKV Brussels Representative, 2006  
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and quality, thus enhancing competitiveness. TÜSİAD, in accordance with its 
mission and in the context of its activities, initiates public debate by 
communicating its position supported by professional research directly to the 
parliament, the government, the media, international organizations and other 
states.165  
  
TÜSİAD closely follows the agenda of the country and government decisions and 
contributes by suggesting solutions, making announcements, informing the public, organizing 
conferences, releasing reports and international institutions. TÜSİAD uses the mass media 
highly as a communication strategy.  
 
TÜSİAD is a member of several organizations (e.g., BIAC - Business and Industry 
Advisory Council of the OECD, UMCE - Union of Mediterranean Confederations of 
Enterprises, and UNICE - Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe). A 
member of UNICE since 1987, TÜSİAD and its members’ interests and concerns are 
represented at the EU level. TÜSİAD is a strong supporter of Turkey’s membership in the 
EU. It asks for further reforms and integration in Turkey (in the mid-1990s, it actively lobbied 
in favor of the establishment of a customs union between the EU and Turkey166) and 
“monitors all governmental and parliamentary activities in relation to the EU.”167 At the EU 
level, it lobbies intensive. An example of this is the lobbying done in 1999, before the start of 
the Helsinki Summit, where the candidacy process of Turkey was officially initiated, when 
TÜSİAD visited 11 European Countries to lobby for Turkey’s candidacy. Another example is 
the lobbying done prior to the European Council meetings in Copenhagen on December 2002, 
                                                 
165 TÜSİAD By-Laws, Purposes  
 
166 TÜSİAD’s Representation Catalogue, 2006  
 
167 Bahadır Kaleağası; “Turkey and the EU- A common future: Associational 
Experiences,” Transnational Associations, The review of the Union of International 
Associations, 4/2005 
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and in Brussels on December 2004, when TÜSİAD visited almost all EU member countries 
and met their respective ministers, prime ministers and presidents.168   
  
TÜSİAD has several working groups, each in charge of different chapters of the EU 
acquis.169 It also has nine committees, which are chaired by boards of directors. These 
committees are the Economic and Financial Affairs Committee, the Parliamentary Affairs 
Committee, the Company Affairs Committee, the External Relations Committee, the Social 
Affairs Committee, the Industry, Services and Agriculture Committee, the Information 
Society and New Technologies Committee, the Regional and Sectoral Development 
Committee and the Country Promotion Committee. The Country Promotion Committee, 
headed by Ümit Boyner, tries to contribute to the image of Turkey, specifically in the EU 
Accession Process. They hold several meetings abroad. An example of these meetings is the 
one held on March 8, 2006 in the European Parliament on women’s rights in Turkey. They 
submit appraisals, develop concepts and raise funds pertaining to the furthering of these 
issues. TÜSİAD formed the “Committee of Harmonization with the EU,” whose participants 
include other TÜSİAD committees working together to follow up the process of 
harmonization with the EU and to transmit the views of the private sector to the government. 
The TÜSİAD Brussels representation opened in 1996. It has a team of experts that has a 
mutual function of transmitting developments in Brussels to members and relaying positions 
of those members to Brussels. They attend meetings and/or organize meetings at several 
institutions, including the European Parliament (as in International Women’s Day in 2006 and 
2007) and the European Commission. They release weekly opinions and research and send 
                                                 
168 TÜSİAD’s Representation Catalogue, 2006  
169  Kaleağası, 2005 
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them to several important places. The head of the office in Brussels Mr. Kaleağası gives 
several interviews to the media during the year.170    
 
 
         c. TUR-BO  
TUR-BO, short for Turkish Research and Business Organizations, was officially 
founded in 2004 in Brussels. In contrast to other Turkish CSOs representations in Brussels, 
TUR-BO was established under Belgian Law. The founders were TÜBITAK, TOBB, 
KOSGEB and TESK. TURBO is an international non-profit association based on the public-
private partnership (PPP), which has also been recognized in the United States for a long time 
and in the EU for a decade.171 TUR-BO is concerned with the Framework Programs (FP) and 
CIP (Competition and Innovation Program).  Turkey participated in the sixth (2002-2006) 
Framework Program172 after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding in 2002. With 
the help of the European Commission, National Contact Points, whose aim is to transfer 
information about the framework programs, were opened.  This was followed by the 
establishment of TURBO, which was to fulfill these tasks: providing information and 
communication, consultancy and training, networking and lobbying, organizing seminars 
related to the framework programs, and releasing reports on the official documents of the 
Commission on the forthcoming seventh FP and CIP. In 2006, TURBO assumed other tasks, 
which included responding to proposals at the EU level under the former Sixth and current 
Seventh Framework Program; the organization took on its first project in June 2006. 
   
         TUR-BO’s area of activity mostly concerns DG Research and DG Enterprise. It attends 
                                                 
170 Interview with Bahadır Kaleaağası, Tüsiad Brussels Representative, 2006 
 
171 Interview with Mehmet Gökgöz, TUR-BO Brussels Representative   
 
172 For more information see http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/   
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the meetings of the DGs when invited and facilitates bilateral information flow. It establishes 
personal contacts for lobbying as well. There are several organizations like TUR-BO at the 
EU level. They are gathered under an umbrella organization called the IGLO (Informal 
Offices Group of RTD Liaison Offices in Brussels) whose aim is to facilitate and enhance the 
interaction, information exchange and co-operation between members of the IGLO, their 
national research systems and the European institutions on issues related to EU R&D, in 
particular, the Framework Program.173 Since it is a member of the IGLO, TUR-Bo is better 
represented at the EU level.  
  
Turkey’s great concern with the Framework Program, the research policy of the EU and, 
concomitantly, building the necessary organizations (TUR-BO), as encouraged by the 
Commission, has led it to adopt the necessary measures and changes in the area. In the 
screening process, Turkey did not face any difficulty in Chapter 25 (i.e., Science and 
Research), with which it had previously harmonized. Thus, Science and Research was the first 
chapter to be opened and closed (on the same day, on June 12, 2006, in Luxembourg). Thus, 
formal negotiations between the EU and Turkey got underway.    
 
         d. TOBB 
TOBB, short for “The Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime 
Commerce, and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey,” was founded in 1952. TOBB represents 
364 members in the form of local chambers of commerce, industry, commerce and industry, 
maritime commerce and commodity exchanges through nearly 1,250,000 firms of different 
sizes. There is a General Assembly composed of a maximum of 1000 members elected for a 
four-year term. The General Assembly forms, through election, five Councils representing 
                                                 
173 Booklet of IGLO, March 2006  
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commerce and exchanges. There is the President, Board of Directors, Secretary General, 
Assistant Secretary General and other professional employees. There are several Directorates 
as well. The TOBB is a large structure consisting of a variety of members from different 
sectors; it protects the rights of its members and helps them in various issue areas. It enables a 
two-way flow of information both to its members from the outside and from its members to 
the outside via the publications it releases. It represents members internationally and 
domestically through memberships in different organizations.  
TOBB has been engaged in EU activities for a considerable time. It has a “Directorate of 
European Union” (DEU)174 as well. TOBB is a member of Eurochambers (Association of 
European Chambers of Commerce and Industry).  The DEU facilitates relations with 
Eurochambers and represents the interests of TOBB members in EU Institutions. It informs 
the business world of the EU Laws, developments, Turkey-EU relations, financial issues and 
so on. The Directorate tries to develop projects in cooperation with Eurochambers to improve 
the quality of service provided by TOBB to its members. The DEU participates in the 
harmonization activities of the General Secretary of the EU, conveying the position of the 
Turkish business world there. There is also an EU Harmonization Commission, founded in 
2005, which follows the issues in the negotiations related to business, examine the topics 
given by the President and makes presentations to the General Assembly. It also monitors the 
work of the Turkey-EU Joint Consultative Committee,175 in which Tobb is represented, and 
coordinates the participation of the representatives. It also coordinates the participation of the 
Turkish private sector in EU programs. The DEU conducts research on Turkey-EU relations 
as well as other issues, prepares reports and informative notes, organizes conferences, 
                                                 
174  http://www.tobb.org.tr/abm/  
 
175 See title “European Economic and Social Committee”  
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seminars, panels and related facilities in Turkey and abroad, and enables its members to 
benefit from the EU documentation center. 
TOBB has been engaged in EU-related activities for a long time. With the start of a new 
period on October 3, 3005, it initiated procedures for establishing a permanent representation 
in Brussels, to be opened in early 2006.176 TOBB anticipates a different structuring that will 
enable the chambers and the CSOs to use the building and the Brussels representation.  
In addition to DEU and the Representation, Harmonization Commission, TOBB also 
operates TEPAV (Economic Policy Research Institute of Turkey) and a university that 
focuses on the EU. TOBB has conduced a number of sector-based research projects that 
concern EU law as well.          
 
         e. İTKİB     
Exporters Associations in Turkey have a long history. They have close ties and relations 
with the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade (a governmental body under the Prime Ministry) 
and the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM), which is the umbrella organization for all 
Exporters Associations. 
The Exporter Associations provide assistance to their members and try to promote trade 
in various sectors. Legally, the Associations can be established on a sector or sub-sector basis. 
There can be more than one Association in the same sector but each must be in different 
regions. Currently, fifty-eight sectoral/regional Exporters Associations operate in Turkey.177 
                                                 
176 Interview with Bülent Bilgiç, Representative of TOBB Brussels, 2006 
 
177 www.itkib.org.tr  
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Textile exporter associations started having relations with the EU in the 1970s.178 
Association protocols have reduced the customs duties in several sectors. However, the case 
of textile has been different due to the large capacity of the Turkish textile sector. Quotas have 
been allocated and other arrangements made with autonomous textile exporters. In the past, 
the Textile Exporters Association had an integrative structure. The association represented all 
the sub-sectors. However, the textile sector has grown so big that the sub-sectors have divided 
into such further subdivisions as ready-made garment, leather and so on. With the Customs 
Union, which became effective in 1996, customs were eliminated. However, “the Customs 
Union covers all industrial goods but does not address agriculture (except processed 
agricultural products), services or public procurement”179. With the Customs Union 
Agreement, the role of the textile exporters associations in the allocation of quotas was 
eliminated but the ongoing relations with the European equivalents have continued, thus their 
efforts and activities as well.  
The Union of Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporters’ Associations (İTKİB) was 
founded in 1986.  Under the name of İTKİB, there are four regional associations:  
• Istanbul Apparel Exporters’ Association 
• Istanbul Textile Exporters’ Association 
• Istanbul Leather Exporters’ Association 
• Istanbul Carpet Exporters’ Association 
77 % of total Turkish apparel exports, 55% of total textile exports, 81% of leather 
exports and 33% of carpet exports are realized by İTKİB member companies in the 
associations. Thus, the İTKİB has high representative power. It tries to help its members and 
promote bilateral and multilateral trade relations. Based on these aims, it conducts several 
                                                 
178 The following information  is based on an interview with Haluk Özelçi, 
Representative of the İTKİB – Brussels 
 
179 European Commission, Bilateral Trade Relations           
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/turkey/index_en.htm  
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activities: the promotion of trade, maintaining and reporting statistics, lobbying, training, 
consulting and coordinating.180  
The İTKİB Brussels Representation was opened in 1996 to continue relations with EU 
and to assist in the bilateral transfer of information. It conducts effective lobbying as well. 
Even though Turkey shares a single market with the EU and has a large volume of textile 
trade with EU member states, due to being non-EU state, was unable acquire membership in 
European umbrella organizations related to textile. Through the efforts of the İTKİB, the by-
laws of the organizations have changed so that the states engaged with the Customs Union are 
allowed as well.181 After these changes, the İTKİB and its members started to become 
members of these organizations. Moreover, they have assumed positions on the boards of 
directors of such organizations. The European-level memberships include EUROTEX - 
European Textile and Apparel Organizations (Turkey is represented with full members, four 
board of directors, and deputy chairman), the CIRFS - International Rayon and Synthetic 
Fibres Committee (there are Turkish firms in the board of directors and the Chairman is Ömer 
Sabancı currently), EUROCOTON - The Committee of the Cotton and Allied Textile 
Industries (deputy chairman is Ertekin Ashaboğlu) and EATP - European Association for 
Textile Polyolefins (on the board of directors). Most of these organizations participate in the 
consultative bodies of the Commission (see CONECCS). Thus, Turkey is represented at the 
EU level. Through the extensive efforts of the İTKİB Brussels Representative Mr. Özelçi, 
Turkish textile and its interests are protected and accurate information is transferred and 
meetings, conferences, projects held in the EU level enable further cooperation.    
 
 
                                                 
180 see www.itkib.org.tr for the activities 
 
181 Interview with Haluk Özelçi, 2006 
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V.  THE STATE OF CSOS IN TURKEY: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
The Turkish Republic inherited a state tradition and the seeds of civil society from the 
Ottoman Empire. It has an organizational culture that is different from what is found in the 
West. In addition, due to political and economic changes, Turkey made gradual progress in 
the area of civil society mainly in the second half of the 20th century. As the impact of the EU 
on civil society and its actors in Turkey grew, primarily during the accession process 
following the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the power, role and general acceptance of CSOs rose 
dramatically. The legitimacy of CSOs in the public’s eye and their visibility in the media 
(with rising press coverage) and elsewhere have increased together. The EU itself has placed 
importance on the third sector in Turkey, both in its reports and in supplying direct funds. The 
EU has also provided a justification (legislative changes) and a purpose that encourage CSOs 
to work (e.g., carry out EU-related projects and attempt to get support). As examined before, 
the Associations Law and the Civil Code have changed; this has created important changes in 
the freedom of associations. The restrictive measures taken towards the activities of CSOs 
have been eliminated and civil society services held by the state have been “civilized” through 
the Department of Associations under the Ministry of the Interior. There have been several 
changes in articles concerning the foundations as well. However, a new Foundations Law was 
enacted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and subsequently vetoed by the President 
of Turkish Republic. 
.  
   97
According to the Associations Department,182 there are 188,170 established associations, 
of which 74,803 are currently active (taken from the official website of the Associations 
Department, updated on Mart 3, 2007). In addition to this, there are around 5,000 foundations 
in Turkey (European Foundation Center country report and Directorate General of 
Associations figures). In light of the developments in the EU, in addition to internal dynamics 
and the total number of the CSOs, it is possible to say that Turkish CSOs have been growing 
in strength. On the other hand, there are still weaknesses and obstacles that need to be 
overcome. They will be examined with the help of several quantitative studies: The first one 
is the “Civil Society Development Center (CSDC)’s “Mapping Study: Civil Society 
Organizations, Needs and Constraints,” done in October, 2005.  The second one is the Civicus 
Civil Society Index (STEP in Turkish), which was conducted with the Third Sector 
Foundation of Turkey. Its results of which were announced in December 2006. The third one 
is Ersin Kalaycıoğlu’s article, “Civil Society in Turkey: Continuity or Change?,”183 which 
contains several surveys and observations of the writer. In addition to these studies, I will use 
the arguments of Sefa Şimşek contained in his article “The Transformation of Civil Society in 
Turkey: From Quantity to Quality”184 as well as several other articles, interviews and my own 
observations.  
 
The research from which I have benefited for this chapter examines different components 
of civil society in order to classify the problems of CSOs and evaluate their strengths and 
weaknesses. In his article, Kalaycıoğlu mostly focuses on associability, social and political 
                                                 
182 http://www.dernekler.gov.tr       
 
183 Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin, “Civil Society in Turkey: Continuity or Change?”, in “Turkish 
Transformation: New Century New Challenges”, W. Beeley, Brian (ed), p.71, 2002 
 
184 Sefa Şimşek, The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey: From Quantity to 
Quality,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp 46-74, Autumn 2004 
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tolerance, interpersonal and inter-institutional trust to define the power of civil society. In 
contrast, STEP classifies CSO according to their structure, environment, values, and the impact 
of civil society on them. Şimşek conducts his evaluation by considering the following criteria: 
separation of the economic sphere from the state and political power, low level of 
fragmentation and hostility in civil society, civility (tolerance and cultural/political relativism), 
existence of individualistic culture in civil society and the existence of horizontal (high quality) 
relations in associational life. The CSDC’s Mapping Study classifies the problems according to 
infrastructure, voluntary networks/cadres and members, relations with the state, intra-
organizational relations within CSOs, organizational relations between CSOs, relations with 
target groups and rest of the society, relations with the media, conceptualization of civil 
society and lobbing activities by CSOs.  
 
I will be using the data aggregately - combining the arguments and the surveys under 
common components. But it is useful to stress in the first place that the generalizability of the 
arguments will sometimes be challenged by the particularity of specific actors and cases, e.g., 
unions or chambers, which have relative power compared to the relative weakness of the 
CSOs in general. As the exceptional cases will not be generalized to the majority and the aim 
of this study is to give a general picture of the area, those cases will not be examined 
specifically.   
 
1. Quantitative Figures and the Content   
  
As stated before, according to the figures of the Associations Department of the Interior 
Ministry of Turkey, there are 180,384 established associations, which is a high number. 
However, only 76,817 are currently active. This which means that more than half have closed 
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or have been passive for various reasons. Even among the active ones, there are many 
organizations that are only registered on paper but do not have sustainable projects. They 
carry out a project only and become inactive afterwards.  
  
According to the early results of STEP, only 7.8 % of the Turkish public is a member of 
a CSO. Of this 7.8, 70.2 % has a membership in one CSO, where the others are have 
membership in more than one.185 Activities without partisan structure (such as writing to a 
newspaper, signing a petition, participating in a demonstration) make up 17.8 % (World 
Values Survey in STEP Results). The reasons may vary. One of them is the lack of trust of the 
Turkish public towards civil society organizations. Turkish citizens recall the widespread 
ideologically motivated organizations and their related activities in the 1960s and 1970s. They 
regard the organizations with suspicion. We see a reflection of this even in the concept of 
itself. The Turkish translation of the term “civil society organization” can be translated in two 
forms. The difference comes from the translation of the term “organization,” which could be 
“örgüt” or “kuruluş.” “Örgüt” has more a partisan or ideological connotation while the term 
“kuruluş” is more neutral and technical. The latter has started to be the preferred translation 
recently.  
 
With respect to the reasons for low membership levels, the STEP survey on the CSOs 
indicates socio-economic factors, factors having to do with various restrictions, and regional 
ones. For example, in Diyarbakır and Ankara, the participants of the survey pointed to a low 
                                                 
 
185 The results in the membership figures may change from survey to survey. According 
to Strateji-MORI research company survey, when the respondents are asked, how they 
relate with NGOs; only 4.8% replied as "membership," where 3.5% as joining to the 
facilities of NGOs and 5,8% as supporting the facilities. So, only 14.1% in total are 
involved in relation with NGOs. 
Source:  Ali Çarkoğlu; “Relations between the State and Civil Society Organizations in 
Turkey," in Taciser Ulaş (ed) "Hello Civil Society," Helsinki Citizens Assembly, 1997. 
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level of societal consciousness and understanding of the responsibilities of citizens. On the 
other hand, participants from Adana emphasized the lack of trust in CSOs. The CSDC ‘s 
survey shows not only lack of members but also an absence or inadequacy of “qualified” 
human resources, which is said to keep new projects and activities from flourishing. However, 
according to the study, this does not mean that the administrators or members are unqualified. 
Rather, it indicates that they need to be equipped intellectually and technically to run an 
effective organization.  According to Kalaycıoğlu, the overall tendency to get involved in 
voluntary associations ("associability") in Turkey is relatively low, though it is rising186. 
Kalaycioglu’s associability survey (Table 5), which is based on different membership 
perspectives of various organizations187 in twenty European countries including Turkey, 
provides comparative data. According to the results, in addition to the differences between the 
countries, in Turkey, associability with organizations working in the area of religion, sports, 
culture/art, trade unions, environment and social welfare/charity are below the average 
whereas, political parties and professional ones are over the average. In order of membership 
strength, political parties, professional organizations, sport organizations, trade unions and 
charity associations are the five top-ranking organizations. In contrast, in general, trade 
unions, sport organizations, religious foundations, culture/art organizations and political 
parties are five top-ranking organizations in other European states. Even so, the overall tendency 
to be involved in the CSOs is low in Turkey. Kalaycıoğlu explains this in terms of the omnipotent 
state tradition, whereby community interests outweigh those of individuals, the image of the 
state as a "father" figure in the public's eye, apolitically raised children (e.g., families 
warning their children to stay away from demonstrations – also seen as a way of keeping 
                                                 
186 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu; “Civil Society and Neopatrimonial Politics” in E. F. Keyman and 
Y. Sarıbay, Globalization, Civil Society and Islam,  pp. 127-9, Ankara, 1998 
 
187 Associability in Comparative Perspective (1990-1997) , Turkish Values Survey 1997 
and World Values Survey 1989/90 in Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, 2002. 
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their children from rebelling – and avoid organizations, political movements and anything 
else that might be considered as dangerous) and patronage politics. Turkish citizens may also 
see involvement in NGOs as a waste of time and not believe in their effectiveness. Financial 
problems of the NGOs are obstacles to employing professional, paid staff. 
 
Poverty in Turkey can also be considered as a factor limiting membership. More than 
half of the population is below the poverty line; thus, civil society attempts are undertaken by 
a small percentage of people who can afford to make a living to a certain extent.188  
 
We may also see obligatory membership in several organizations in Turkey such as law 
associations and trade unions. Scholars have charged that this conflicts with the voluntarism 
of civil society organizations. On the other hand, in countries where the civil society culture is 
not developed adequately and “the institutional infrastructure is weak, obligatory membership 
would be useful to promote institutional development189 and develop civic culture. 
   
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
188 Following sources: 
Yerasimos, Stefanos, “Civil Society Organizations in Turkey, State and the Accession 
Process,” in The Future of Civil Society, Körper Stiftung, 2001 
Interview with Ahmet Evin, Sabancı University.        
 
189 Interview with Güven Sak, Director of TEPAV, 2005 
   102
                                                   
                                                 
                                                Table 2 
                   Associability in Comparative Perspective                                                                          
 
  
With respect to perception of membership, Kalaycıoğlu focuses on the level of trust in 
Turkey. According to him, the culture of distrust seems to be well established in Turkish 
society. For instance, when the level of interpersonal trust is examined, it is seen that nine out 
of ten people in Turkey do not trust their fellow human beings. Turkey shares the lowest level 
of interpersonal trust with Brazil among the countries in the World Values Survey conducted 
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in the 1990s.190 This shows that establishing and maintaining partnerships are difficult. We 
can see the reflection of this situation in the high percentage of family firms and in their 
success. Under these circumstances, primordial ties (lineage, regional bonds, marriage, etc) 
emerge as the only bases on which partnership can be established. This explains why "regional 
solidarity organizations" are so widespread in Turkey. Also, there is lack of interinstitutional 
trust in Turkey. It is why there is not much partnership among the NGOs. Even funds from the 
EU cannot be benefited from fully because they may require partnerships as criteria. The 
STEP survey confirms this. Co-operation and communication between CSOs is weak both in 
Turkey and on the international level. STEP points out that although the platforms and 
networks that the CSOs have developed in Turkey are increasing, effort to create common 
rules that organize the inter-structure is limited. Şimşek argues that that in non-western 
models, civil society is based largely on bonds of reciprocity, mutual trust and informal ties 
rather than on formal contracts between individuals, which is the case in western models.191 
As Turkey has both a non-western and western culture, this would be the reason for 
Kalaycıoğlu’s argument that the types of organizations are mostly based on primordial ties.  
This results in a lack of institutional culture in organizations. Moreover, due to interpersonal 
conflicts, there is a high level of fragmentation. The organizations are subdivided under 
different names due to personal clashes and/or interests, thus a high level of unconstructive 
and damaging rivalry may occur. Fragmentation does not only reveal itself in this kind of 
partitioning but also in political terms. The political affiliations of some groups may place 
them on different places along the political spectrum. Şimşek says this situation exists in 
                                                 
190 Interpersonal Trust (1990-1997), Turkish Values Survey 1997 and World Values 
Survey 1989/90 in E. Kalaycıoğlu, 2002.  
191 Jenny B. White, “Civic Culture and Islam in Urban Turkey,” pp. 143-4, in Chris 
Hann and Elisabeth Dunn (eds), Civil Society Challenging Western Models, Routledge, 
1996. 
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business unions and chambers that sympathize with different political ideologies and gives 
examples of them.   
                         
Leadership is also a crucial component of the CSOs, an element that is a reflection of 
Turkish political culture. Added to the difficulty of getting volunteers to commit themselves 
to the organizations without receiving material benefit in return, the leader assumes greater 
responsibility by assuming the role of chief motivator and serving as the backbone to the 
staying power of the organization. As a consequence, the vulnerability of the organizations 
rises.  When the leader changes, or in the case of weak leadership, the organization may 
dissolve, which is also a result of lack of institutional culture. The agenda, the direction or the 
tempo of the CSO may fluctuate as well during the terms in office of different leaders. The 
organization may increase its power and activities with one leader while it might go downhill 
completely with another. Thus, sustainability and the stability of the Turkish CSOs cannot be 
ensured.  
 
Though membership in CSOs and involvement in civil movements is low in Turkey, 
spontaneous events may result in an increase in such membership, even if not necessarily in 
an organized or institutionalized way. These are limited incidences that appear during a big 
domestic or international event - mainly political or military - which are fostered by 
international movements and the media; or when the tolerance of the public is overwhelmed 
by. The outcome reveals itself in different forms, including demonstrations and marches, or 
various collective actions taken to protest major societal or political events.  
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2. Budgetary Concerns 
  
CSOs in Turkey lack financial sufficiency and an ability to create resources.192 Though 
membership fees and personal donations are important components of the income of CSOs, 
they contribute relative little to the budgets of CSOs in Turkey. CSOs have difficulty in 
getting funds from the state, private sector or international organizations.193 The EU 
perception seems to affect this picture. Even though some parts of civil society are unable to 
benefit from these funds, due to lack of information, long, detailed and complicated project-
writing procedures and professional staff, there is a rising tendency of CSOs to apply for 
CSOs funds to facilitate their projects. This financial motivation has an impact on their will to 
sustain their organizations. In other words, it has begun to have a spillover effect starting with 
financial terms, leading to other types of impacts and co-operations.  However, the financial 
deficits of CSOs are still very widespread in Turkey. This affects them in many aspects - 
varying from not being able to employ professional staff or rent a permanent office to not 
being able to develop projects.    
 
                 3. Individualism Concerns 
According to Yerasimos,194 development of civil society in Europe seems directly 
related to the evolution of post-industrial societies. Among the reasons, he notes that in 
today’s societies, which are based on individuals and their freedoms, the solidarity that exists 
                                                 
192 Mapping survey of CSDC (STGM). 
 
193  STEP 
 
194  Stefanos Yerasimos, “Civil Society, Europe and Turkey,” in S. Yerasimos, G. 
Seufert, N. Mert, various writers Civil Society and Nationalism in Turkey, İletişim, 
2000.     
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in traditional societies has disappeared. Hence, individuals who lack this feeling of solidarity 
tend to cooperate in various areas to make up for it.  
  
Can Paker notes that195 individualism and liberal economy have not developed 
adequately in Turkey, something that hinders the development of civil society. Ersin 
Kalaycıoğlu196 also stresses the same deficiency in Turkey. He says that individualism and 
privacy as the realm of the private is lacking in Turkey. The individual himself, his 
independence and interests in society should be accepted. The individual as a value should be 
recognized. Private life should be distinguished from the public one as a different but 
legitimate sphere. He mainly refers to a Hegelian type of civil society. Moreover, he adds that 
only after fulfilling individualism can there be a transition to collectivism.  
 
Hale197 refers to liberalization policies as a step to civil society. He points to the 1950s, 
even more, the 1960s, as the period where the seeds of civil society organizations in the 
modern Turkey were sewn. This revealed itself in labor unions, employment organizations, 
and economic interest organizations. However, he also refers to the Islamic tradition, where 
social solidarity and social interaction is high, and tradition asks for homogeneity. In contrast, 
in the West, market freedoms, which are individualistic, dominate. He adds that there has 
been a redefinition of Islamic politics and faith-based movements, organizations, forms and 
values. He also refers to the counterparts of faith-based movements such as Catholic actions 
in other countries.  
 
                                                 
195 Interview with Can Paker, Executive Manager of TESEV, 2005 
 
196 Interview with Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Rector of Işık University, 2005  
 
197 Interview with William Hale, Sabancı University, 2005 
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Elisabeth Özdalga describes the status of individuals in the Islamic movement and its 
relevance to civil society. As Şimşek says, “The fact is that a tug-of-war between 
communitarianism and individualism is going on within the Islamic movement itself. This is 
also an important reason why it is wrong to condemn their organizations as being without 
relevance for the construction of a civil society.”198 Sefa Şimşek, says the following: 
 The concept of civil society is based on free associations and this is only possible 
where free individuals exist. Free individuals do not emerge solely by lifting the 
coercions and constraints that stifle them. There must be some degree of 
individualistic culture in society. Though this culture, individuals can develop not 
only their own identities with some autonomy from their family, group or 
community, but also develop the ability to think about themselves, their social life, 
institutions and political leaders. Turkish people generally create a great cult 
around their leaders (Sefa Şimşek, 2004).   
 
All the scholars I have cited place a great importance on individualism and its 
components. They note that in Turkey this concept has not yet been fulfilled. Turkey is more 
a case of solidarity and community. This damages the infrastructure of civil society itself. On 
the other hand, this leads to CSOs based on primordial ties (family, kinship, neighborhood, 
tribe, ethnic and religious communities199). On this point, there is vagueness in the literature 
on the inclusion or exclusion of these primordial units in civil society. Some scholars include 
them in civil society whereas others exclude them. This distinction is crucial because in the 
cases where they are included, it can be argued that the Islamic societies have had relatively 
strong civil societies; when left out, the opposite can be argued.200  
 
                                                 
198 Elizabeth Özdalga, “Civil Society and its Enemies: Reflections on a Debate in the 
light of Recent Developments within the Islamic Student Movement in Turkey,” in Sefa 
Şimşek, 2004. 
 
199 Esmail, “Self, Society, Civility and Islam,” p 61 
 
200 Choueiri, pp. 487-488 
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Since the liberalization movements of the 1950s, transition to an open market, 
elimination of restrictions on associations and individuals, and the impact of the EU on human 
rights, rapid improvements in civil society have occurred. Turkey is experiencing the use of a 
different, mixed model in the transition to civil society. This is due to Turkey’s Ottoman 
heritage, its unique transition to democracy, and all the reforms that have been undertaken 
recently.  
 
4. Civil Society Organizations and the State 
 
The state and civil society are not opposite concepts representing mutually exclusive 
entities. Civil society will assume different tasks in different countries at different times. Civil 
society will be supplementary in cases where the state remains insufficient; it will taken on an 
advocacy role to raise public opinion and awareness; it will adopt a supervisory role to 
monitor the actions of the state; “it will serve an intermediary role, standing between the 
private sphere and the state201 like a buffer zone to the actions of the state and mechanisms of 
the market economy;”202 it will play an informative role when it reaches to different levels of 
the society with the researches it holds in its specified area; it will be complementary when it 
assumes some of the responsibilities of the state itself, mostly when asked to by the state (e.g., 
the Scandinavian Model and quangos, as well). In none of the cases is civil society and the 
state enemies or rivalries. An ideal case is where civil society is a “critical friend”203of the 
state. The critical friend model foresees both distance and closeness of the two actors vis-à-vis 
each other. Civil society helps the state to operate better. It may affect the policymaking 
                                                 
201 Diamond, p. 5  
202 Erözden 
203 Model used by Education Reform Initiative (İstanbul Policy Center), Sabancı 
University  
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process. It does not act like an opposition party against the state nor as a sub-department of 
the state to promote it. It provides constructive criticism of state decisions when it thinks that 
it is necessary while showing how to make the policy better. When interacting with the state, 
the organization always maintains its own autonomy. Prof. Dr. Üstün Ergüder, chairman of 
the Education Reform Initiative (ERI), targets a critical friend model in the education field. 
The ERI is a project launched within the Istanbul Policy Center at Sabancı University to 
improve education policy and decision-making through research, advocacy and monitoring. It 
does so by gathering several CSOs (Association of Private Schools, Mother and Child 
Education Foundation, Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation) under the umbrella 
structure of the ERI. Its aim is to encourage inter-organizational dialogue among CSOs. 
Among its policy areas and activities, the ERI is focused on curriculum reform, research on 
demographics, organizing conferences on finding the best practices in education, education 
sector studies (in collaboration with the World Bank), the EU Gender Project, religion and 
education.204 While undertaking these activities, because it wants to affect the macro policies 
of the state in the field of education, the staff of the ERI interacts with state officials in 
various ways. It develops cordial communication while maintaining the critical tone of the 
dialogue. During four years of functioning, the ERI has made its voice publicly heard as well; 
media coverage has risen dramatically, which gives it more power. The initiative has been 
trying to advocate its policies for an improved comprehensive education by attempting to 
affect the policy-making process. In contrast, most Turkish CSOs dealing with education 
mainly focus on supplying scholarships, building schools and transferring donations. The ERI 
and other CSOs have a difficult mission. Traditionally, the state has had excessive power in 
                                                 
204 Education Reform Initiative, Presentation Catalogue, 2005 
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exercising its policies in education. But there has been progress in the interaction and 
cooperation between the state and the CSOs in the area of education recently.  
 
There is lack of sufficient dialogue between the state and civil society actors according 
to STEP and the CSDC. It is also said that there are problems in implementing the changes in 
the law. But it would be unrealistic to expect that trust and an internalization of changes can 
occur immediately. What is needed is time and the practice that takes place within a learning 
process supported by training and internal and external assistance. There have been attempts 
to do this. For example, the Department of Associations held a long-term training project 
supported by the British Embassy. Its goals was contributing to the project of “developing 
public services and quality standards of civil society organizations,” carried out by the 
European Commission and the Ministry of the Interior. The project aimed at adopting the 
reforms that have taken place in within civil society and examining state-civil society 
examples taken from EU member states. The project had six activities of which the last one 
was the evaluation and sharing seminar of this project. It was entitled the “Evaluation of 
Reforms towards Civil Society in the EU Process and Sample Country Practices” and held in 
December 2005 in Ankara. I had the opportunity to listen and observe at this seminar. During 
two days, the CSOs and the civil servants from the Associations Department met and 
exchanged views directly, both in seminars and workshops. This was a positive development 
and a sign of improvement in the interaction of the state and CSOs. Another example is the 
project “Improving Co-operation between the NGOs and the Public Sector and Strengthening 
the NGOs’ (SKIP in Turkish) Democratic Participation Level,” which is managed by 
Secretariat General for European Union Affairs205 (EUSG). Working with the Contracting 
                                                 
205  The EUSG was founded in 2000 under the Prime Ministry. Its objective is in 
conformity with plans and programs, and channels and shoulders the internal 
coordination of the preparations and the harmonization work to be carried out by the 
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Authority is the Central Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU). The project aims to strengthen 
the cooperation between the civil society and the public sector.206  
 
We see that there has been a relative transformation of the view of the state towards 
CSOs. As noted by Uzun,207 there has been a change in the perception of the state. In the past, 
the organizations wanted to be kept under pressure, where now, they want to be developed. 
As for the Associations Department, it would like to create more dialogue. The department is 
also trying to ease the procedures and reduce the red tape the associations must face in their 
relations with the state – for example, by the implementation of “e-associations application” 
(web based), which enables them to handle procedures via the Associations Department’s 
website.208  
  
                                                                                                                                                        
Turkish public organizations and agencies within the framework of efforts to prepare 
Turkey for full membership in the EU (article 1 of its by-law. Its functions are a) 
coordinating, in conformity with plans and programs, internal efforts of harmonization 
to be carried out by the Turkish public organizations and agencies; b) providing 
secretarial services to the boards and committees, which shall be established with a view 
to preparing Turkey for membership to the EU, and guiding the implementation of the 
decisions of the said boards and committees; c) conducting required research and studies 
in line with the decisions of the Government and the boards and committees to be 
established; d) awarding, by contract and in areas of its competence, to natural and legal 
persons both within Turkey and abroad the tasks of making studies, research and 
translations; e) issuing, through the Prime Ministry, regulations, communications, 
circulars and other similar regulatory instruments concerning the services that it is 
responsible to render. (Article 2 of its by-law) 
Source: http://www.abgs.gov.tr  
 
206 Further information about the project is given in title “civil society dialogue.” 
 
207 Interview with Şentürk Uzun, Head of Associations Department, Interior Ministry of 
Turkey, 2005  
 
208 Interview with Ramazan Yiğit, Deputy Head of Associations Department, Interior 
Ministry of Turkey, 2005  
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There is no regular consultation mechanism in the Turkish Government system as there 
is in the EU, but there are spontaneous bilateral contacts between the government and such 
CSOs as syndicates and business organizations.  Encouraged by the EU, the CSOs have 
increased their efforts to affect the policies in their working area, though it remains limited. 
For example, women’s NGOs have become very well organized; they have formed a platform 
and have lobbied at the EU level to get support. In addition, they have raised public awareness 
and gotten the articles in the Civil Code and the Penal Code modified in their favor.  Another 
is the environment organizations dealing with a number of power stations. Business 
organizations also affect EU policy and the industrial policy of the state.  
 
According to STEP’s diagrams, the impact of Turkish CSOs on policy making is greater 
than their structure (e.g., On a scale where the highest value is 3, structure has a value of 0.7 
while that of impact one of 1.3) This can be explained by two factors: the first has to do with 
the intensified work of organizations in specific areas such as gender equality. The second 
concerns the heterogenic distribution of the power and structure of the organizations in 
Turkey. The activities and lobbying carried out by big institutional organizations, which 
mostly have elitist structures and are adequately financed through their own means, will affect 
the policy-making process more. In addition, there are criticisms of these elitist structures.  
Yerasimos209 notes that it is natural that the leading, guiding forces of a new movement are 
elitists. He adds that it should be perceived as natural, too, that the civil society movement in 
Turkey is inspired by external examples since this movement is a recent product of the 
process of westernization. 
                                                 
209 Stefanos Yerasimos, “Civil Society Organizations in Turkey, State and the Accession 
Process,” in The Future of Civil Society, Körper Stiftung, 2001        
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this study, which focuses on Turkish Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in 
the EU Accession Process, was to provide answers to the following questions:  
 
 What is the legacy of civil society in EU institutions? What is the main legislation 
(binding or unbinding) in the area? 
 Who are the main actors in the EU that have influence on civil society organizations? 
 What is the impact of the EU on civil society in Turkey and on the Turkish Civil Society 
Organizations in the EU accession process? 
 What is the state of civil society organizations in Turkey?  
 
Prior to answering these questions, a definition of the main concepts used in this study 
had to be made. In the literature, there is lack of consensus on the definition of civil society 
and its actors. Even the terminology, (e.g., voluntary organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, and civil society organizations) is imprecise. Therefore, finding a generally 
accepted definition was problematic. In the end, the definition used by the European 
Economic and Social Committee in its “Opinion,” which is rather broad scope, was chosen 
since it focuses on civil society organizations and what they include.  The organizations 
counted under CSOs included many organizations such as NGOs and business associations.    
 
Civil society and CSOs in Turkey are not recent phenomena. There used to be 
foundations, “guild”s, “akhi”s in the Ottoman period, which have been elaborated upon in this 
study. But we can not talk about the absolute autonomy of those organizations from the 
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central power. In addition, they were not CSOs in the sense we understand today. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that they are archetypes of modern-day CSOs that developed 
with the changing structure of the state following the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Of 
course, it was not only those organizations that were inherited by the Turkish Republic but 
also the ruling tradition and socio-cultural values that were transferred to the new state. 
Elements of culture such as the dominance of the central state over society, community 
interests over individual interests, patrimonialism, father state image, and the nature of  
center-periphery relations also continued during the newly born republic. Political, social, 
cultural and economic changes both in Turkey and the world have led to the rise of civil 
society and, similarly, CSOs in Turkey, e.g., there has been a shift to multi-party system, 
globalization, global movements, spread of media, liberalization. Starting with the late 1990s, 
we see that there has been a rapid change occurring in civil society. This is mainly due to the 
EU accession process, which was fostered by the Helsinki Summit where Turkey acquired 
candidacy status. Since then, Turkey has been highly affected by the EU reforms that are 
being created in the form of legislative packages by the governments. These reforms have also 
involved amendments to the laws concerning civil society organizations directly or indirectly. 
For example, the Civil Code and the Associations Law have already been changed and the 
Foundations Law is on the waiting list. The Copenhagen Political Criteria have been 
sufficiently fulfilled, as the European Commission expressed in its Recommendation on 
Turkey’s Progress towards Accession on October 6, 2004 (before the EU Council’s decision 
of December 17, 2004, which announced that it would commence the negotiations in October 
2005).  The political criteria have involved democracy, rule of law, human rights, respect for 
and protection of minorities, which have given CSOs greater space to operate freely.   
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The EU has been advocating the freedom of associations and other freedoms concerning 
the CSOs in Turkey. Over time, the CSOs, through their rising  
self-awareness and strengthened power, have started to advocate their own rights and become 
active initiators rather than passive subjects to the decisions made.  But this does not mean 
that they do not need any more help, or that they are adequate enough. 
 
The EU began to supply funding to Turkey especially after the Helsinki Summit when 
Turkey started to officially participate in EU programs as a mew candidate. These programs 
and related funds are also channeled to Turkish CSOs, which suffer budgetary problems. Not 
only they are supported financially in this way; this economic motivation also encourages 
them to come up with projects and cooperate with other organizations both in Turkey and 
abroad. Thus, organizations have started to flourish and develop on account of EU 
encouragement. 
 
In order to provide an idea of the organic relationship that exists between the EU and 
Turkish CSOs, the EU’s legal arrangements concerning the civil society arena were examined 
at the beginning of this study. It was seen that there was acquis communautaire in the area but 
only non-coercive, unbinding documents designed to make the area easier for CSOs to 
operate in and enable them to participate in the EU policy-making process. The EU 
recognizes the competency of member states to determine their laws for the CSOs operating 
in their own countries. Nevertheless, with the White and Green Papers, communications, 
dialogues and other types of documents and through the EU Institutions’ direct interactions 
with the CSOs, the EU has had an influence on them. But this has not been in the form of 
interference. Due to the legislation power of the EU, which affects many actors in the member 
states at every level, especially economically; the CSOs try to get closer to EU institutions so 
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as to be able to be involved in the decision-making process. The EU wants to reduce 
deficiency in democratic practice and its distance to EU publics through CSOs, which 
represent many levels of the society. The EU also would like to find out if the decisions it 
makes are the most effective and appropriate. It does this by obtaining opinions from the 
organizations that represent the actors that will be affected by the decisions concerned. 
Therefore, the interest and will for EU-CSOs interaction are mutual. Almost all the EU 
institutions have a link with the CSOs somehow but some have more. For example, the 
European Parliament (EP), European Commission and the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EECS), which have direct intensive interactions with EU Organizations and have 
been enclosed in the scope of this study. The European Council does not interact extensively 
with the organizations at the EU level. They operate mostly in the national level via their 
bureaucrats working there and so have been kept out of the scope in this study. Other 
institutions are not examined either due to their relatively low impact on civil society and/or 
lack of direct link with Turkish CSOs.  It was discovered that the European Parliament was a 
very attractive place for lobbyists because of its openness and rising influence on the 
decision-making process via the co-decision procedure it practices with the Council. Among 
the many lobbyists accredited to the EP, there are also Turkish lobbyists. CSOs in Turkey or 
their representations in Brussels lobby directly or indirectly in the EP in favor of Turkish 
membership. European Commission is one of the most influential institutions dealing with 
CSOs due to its executive power, direct interactions and documents on the area, which are 
elaborated in detail in this study. Among these, the civil society dialogue concerns Turkey 
highly.  This dialogue intends to get the EU and the Turkish public closer and more familiar 
with each other. The EU is a living organism which learns from its mistakes and moves ahead 
accordingly. This dialogue was constructed after the 2004 enlargement of ten countries for 
which the EU publics had not been ready and to which they reacted. The European 
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Commission does not have an accreditation system for CSOs like the EP but rather a database 
called CONECCS, which makes it easier to reach organizations and make them known. 
Though there are no restrictions on candidate countries, there are no Turkish organizations on 
the list - only Turkish CSOs that are indirectly involved as members of several EU level 
federations or confederations which exist inside CONECCS. Finally, there is the European 
Economic and Social Committee, which is an advisory body for other institutions and 
involves CSOs in its body. Turkish CSOs interacts with this Committee via the Joint 
Consultancy Committee, which holds meetings twice a year. Except for these bilateral 
relations with the EU Institutions, there are also Turkish CSOs’ representations in Brussels, 
though they are not outnumbered. They are mostly business oriented and are branches of big 
organizations operating in Turkey. They lobby well but still many more organizations from 
Turkey are needed for a more effective lobbying, something that Turkey has only started to 
realize the importance of very recently.  
 
The state of civil society organizations in Turkey has been elaborated by referring to 
their weakness and strengths. CSOs in Turkey in the recent decades have grown along with 
developments in Turkey–EU relations. The changing laws on Associations and Civil Code 
have given them a greater space in which to operate and the changing environment has 
enabled them to become more conscious of their role in society. They have also become 
legitimate in the public’s eyes mainly after specific events such as the 1999 Earthquake, the 
EU’s assistance to CSOs and the rise of press coverage, mainly starting in the late 1990s. 
Civil society organizations have been increasing their visibility in the media; these are mainly 
the ones working on environment, gender issues, business and education. They have started to 
contribute to policy making as well. The examples of women’s organizations affecting the 
Civil Code and the Penalty Code can be given. A rising number of CSOs has created public 
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awareness on societal problems.  But still, these kinds of efforts and their impacts are limited. 
The interaction between CSOs and the state is enhancing but it is a matter of time and a 
learning process. 
CSOs have structural problems. Qualified human resources are absent or inadequate. 
The organizations are hard to hire professional staff in addition to volunteers because of 
financial difficulties. Most of them work in a “disinstitutional” structure and do not have 
organizational culture. Though there are a great number of associations registered, they end 
up becoming inactive after having a sole project or activity, therefore they are not sustainable. 
Additionally, within and between the organizations, there is lack of trust, which hinders co-
operations and causes clashes and divisions inside the CSOs.  
Civil society organizations in Turkey have gradually developed over the past two 
decades because of EU encouragement. It is not asserted that the EU is the only variable 
influencing the transformation of Turkish CSOs. But it is a strong factor. The increased 
perception of EU membership and the impact of this on Turkish legislation have encouraged 
CSOs in Turkey. Though they have not reached the desired level of development, they have 
taken big steps towards keeping the momentum going. The transformation of civil society is 
not only political, or economical but also cultural and societal; thus, it takes time to be 
internalized by the public, which constitutes the CSOs itself. As the formal negotiations 
between Turkey and EU started on June 12, 2006, CSOs now have a bigger role in the process 
through their coming efforts to get the acquis internalized by the public, lobbying in the EU 
level for membership and bridging relationships between the Turkish and the EU publics.    
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ANNEXES 
 
 
 
1. 
 
Main dates in the evolution of the European social dialogue1  
1985   The launch of the bipartite dialogue, initiated and supported by the Commission, and 
traditionally known as the "Val Duchesse" process, after the place where the first 
meeting was held. The social partners begin to adopt non-binding joint opinions. 
1991 Against the background of the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference, the social 
partners negotiate the Agreement of 31 October 1991, proposing reforms to the 
Treaty decision-making provisions in the social policy field. The social partners' 
proposals are incorporated virtually verbatim into the Protocol on Social Policy 
annexed to the Treaty on European Union. 
1993 Commission Communication "concerning the implementation of the Protocol on Social 
Policy" [COM (1993) 600 final]. 
1994 The Treaty on European Union enters into force. 
1995 Successful negotiation of the parental leave agreement, the first Article 139 
framework agreement implemented by Council directive. 
1996 Commission Communication "concerning the development of the social dialogue at 
Community level" [COM (1996) 448 final]. 
1997 Successful negotiation of the second framework agreement implemented by directive 
– on part-time work. 
  The provisions of the Protocol on Social Policy are incorporated into the Amsterdam 
Treaty as Articles 138 and 139.  
1998 20 May:Commission Communication '"Adapting and promoting the social dialogue at 
Community level" [COM (1998) 322 final] defines the criteria for the establishment, 
composition and operation of sectoral dialogue committees and constitutes a new 
departure for the development of social dialogue within sectors at European level.  
1999 Successful negotiation of the third framework agreement implemented by Council 
directive - on fixed-term work. 
2000 Lisbon European Summit, the Heads of State and Government set out a ten-year 
strategy for the economic and social development of the European Union. The 
                                                 
1 Chart is taken from: “Social Dialogue”,  
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/index_en.htm 
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common vision requires an integrated approach across a range of economic, social 
and environmental policy areas, in order to achieve sustainable economic growth, 
more and better jobs, with greater social cohesion. The successful implementation of 
the Lisbon agenda requires the active involvement of the social partners. Presentation 
of the Social Policy Agenda at the Nice European Council in December 2000, which 
underlines the importance of social dialogue in promoting competitiveness, solidarity 
and an appropriate balance between flexibility and security in employment.  
2001 11 December: "Joint Contribution" of the social partners to the Laeken European 
Council. 
2002 26 June: Commission Communication "The European Social Dialogue, a force for 
innovation and change" [COM (2002) 341 final].  
  A new generation of texts entailing a greater implementation and monitoring role for 
the social partners - Firstly, adoption in March 2002 of the Framework of Actions for 
the lifelong development of competencies and qualifications, to be implemented by 
the open method of co-ordination. Secondly, adoption in July 2002 of the telework 
agreement, the first "autonomous" Article 139 framework agreement, to be 
implemented and monitored by the social partners themselves.  
  28 November: Adoption of the first independent joint multi-annual work programme 
for years 2003-5.  
2003 First Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment; with the Council 
Presidency, the President of the Commission and highest-level representatives of the 
social partners (on basis of Council Decision of 6 March 2003).  
2004  12 August: Communication from the Commission "Partnership for change in an 
enlarged Europe - Enhancing the role of European Social Dialogue [COM (2004) 557 
Final] 
  8 October: Adoption of the second 'autonomous' agreement on work-related stress.  
2005 Mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy: The European Council (22-23 March) 
reiterates the importance of the social partners’ active involvement in order to achieve 
the strategy’s objectives on growth and employment 
  Conclusion of the Framework of Actions on gender equality, identifying work priorities 
for the national social partners.  
  29 September: Social Dialogue Summit - 20 years of European social dialogue 
celebrated  in Palais d'Egmont in Brussels. 
2006 13 March: First European sectoral social dialogue conference. 
  23 March: Presentation of the second joint multi-annual work programme (2006-
2008) at the Tripartite Social Summit. 
  25 April: Signature of the first multi-sectoral agreement on crystalline silica covering 
more than 2 million workers. 
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ANNEX 
2 
Comparison of Associations Law 
Former Associations Law 
No: 2908 
New Associations Law 
No: 5253 
Civil Code 
No: 4721 
Article Name of Article Article Name of Article Article Name of 
Article 
Art.1 Object Art.1 Object and Scope  - 
Art.2 Scope Art.1 Object and Scope  - 
Art.3 Definitions Art.2 Definitions  - 
Art.4 Entitlement to 
Establish 
Associations 
Art.3 Entitlement to 
Establish 
Associations 
 - 
Art.5 Associations 
subject to 
restrictions and 
prohibited activities 
Art.30 Associations 
subject to 
restrictions and 
prohibited activities
 - 
Art.6 Restriction to use 
certain names and 
signs 
Art.29 Restriction to use 
certain names and 
signs 
 - 
Art.7 Restriction to 
International 
Activities  
 -  - 
Art.8 Statute of the 
Association 
Art.4 Statute of the 
Association 
 - 
Art.9 Having Legal 
Entity by 
Associations, 
Declaration of 
establishment 
 - Art.59 State of being a 
legal entity 
Art.10 Declaration and 
examination of By-
Law 
 - Art.60 Examination 
Art.11 International 
Activities of 
Associations 
founded in Turkey 
Art.5 International 
Activities 
 - 
Art.12 Activities in Turkey 
of Associations 
founded abroad 
Art.5 International 
Activities 
 - 
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Art.13 Declaration  -  - 
Art.14 First General 
Assembly Meeting 
 - Art.62 First General 
Assembly 
Meeting 
Art.15 Association’s File 
and Registration 
Procedures 
 -  - 
Art.16 Right to be a 
member 
 - Art.64 Conditions of 
Membership 
Art.17 Termination of 
membership 
 - Art.65 
Art.66 
Art.67 
Automatically 
Discharge from 
Associations 
Discharge 
Reasons 
Art.18 Rights of members Art.6  Voting by the 
Legal Entity 
Art.63 
Art.66 
Art.68 
Art.69 
Rule 
Discharge from 
Associations 
Equal Rights 
Voting Right 
Art.19 Organs of 
Association 
 - Art.72 In General 
Art.20 General Assembly 
Meetings 
 - Art.74 
Art.75 
Ordinary 
Meetings 
Extra-ordinary 
Meetings 
Art.21 Procedure of Call  - Art.77 Call for Meeting
Art.22 Place of Meeting  - Art.78 Place and 
quorum of the 
meeting 
 
Art.23 Adequate number 
of Meeting 
 - Art.78 Place and 
quorum of the 
meeting 
 
Art.24 Method of Meeting  - Art.79 Convening the 
meeting 
Art.25 Issues to be 
discussed in 
Meeting 
 - Art.79 Convening the 
meeting 
Art.26 Authorities and 
duties of the 
General Assembly 
 - Art.80 Duties and 
powers of the 
general 
assembly 
Art.27 Formation of Board 
of Directors 
 - Art.84 
Art.85 
Formation 
Functions 
Art.28 Situation of 
Incompleteness of 
Board of Directors 
by deputy members 
 - Art.84 Formation 
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Art.29 Formation of 
Auditors Board and 
Duties 
 - Art.86 Auditors’ Board 
Art.30 Notifications of 
selected organs to 
the administration 
 
Art.23 General assembly 
meeting and 
notifications of 
selected organs to 
the administration 
 
 - 
Art.31 Formation of 
Branches 
 - Art.94 Formation 
Art.32 Organs of Branches  - Art.95 Legal organs of 
the branch and 
applicable 
provisions 
Former Associations Law 
No: 2908 
New Associations Law 
No: 5253 
Civil Code 
No: 4721 
Art.33 Clauses that 
Associations are 
subject to 
Art.7 General 
Assemblies of the 
Branches 
Art.95 Legal organs of 
the branch and 
applicable 
provisions 
Art.34 Federation and 
Confederations 
Art.8 Federation and 
Confederations 
Art.96 
Art.97 
Federation 
Confederation 
Art.35 By-Laws  - Art.96 
Art.97 
Federation 
Confederation 
Art.36 Having Legal 
Statute 
 - Art.96 
Art.97 
Federation 
Confederation 
Art.37 Activities that are 
prohibited or 
subject to 
Permission 
Art.30 Associations 
subject to 
restrictions and 
prohibited activities
 
 - 
Art.38 Purpose and 
Activities of 
Students’ 
Associations 
 -  - 
Art.39 Purpose and 
Activities of 
Associations that 
Civil Servants 
founded 
 -  - 
Art.40 Prohibition of 
activities subject to 
National Defence 
and security forces 
act 
Art.30 Associations 
subject to 
restrictions and 
prohibited activities
 
 - 
Art.41 Facilities to be 
founded by the 
associations prior to 
permission   
Art.26 Facilities to be 
founded by the 
associations prior 
to permission   
 - 
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Art.42* Prohibition to carry 
gun 
 -  - 
Art.43 Relations with the 
foreign 
Associations and 
Organisations 
 -  - 
Art.44* Announcement of 
Declaration 
 -  - 
Art.45 Liability To Submit 
Statements and 
Inspection 
 
Art.19 Liability To Submit 
Statements and 
Inspection 
 
 - 
Art.46 Department for 
Associations 
(“Dernekler Dairesi 
Baskanlığı”) 
 -  - 
Art.47 Financial auditing 
of public benefit 
associations 
 -  - 
Art.48 Competence of the 
Security 
Department 
And Administration 
Art.20 Competence of the 
Security 
Department 
 
 - 
Art.49 Dissolution under 
the General 
Assembly 
 - Art.88 Dissolution 
under resolution 
of the general 
assembly 
Art.50 Dissolution by 
Court 
 - Art.89 Dissolution by 
Court 
Art.51 State of dissolution 
automatically 
 - Art.87 Dissolution Ipso 
Facto 
Art.52 Closure of 
Associations by 
Court’s Decision 
 - Art.89 Dissolution by 
Court 
Art.53* Closure of Illegal 
Associations 
 -  - 
Art.54 Detaining of 
Association’s 
Activities by the 
Province 
 -  - 
Art.55 Liquidation 
 
Art.15 Liquidation 
 
 - 
Art.56 Prohibition to 
facilitate in the 
Organs of Student 
Associations 
 -  - 
Art.57 Youth and Sporting 
Clubs 
Art.14 Youth and Sporting 
Clubs 
 - 
Art.58 Qualification to Art.27 Public Benefit  - 
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operate to public 
benefits 
Associations 
Art.59 Acceptance as a 
public benefit 
association 
Art.27 Public Benefits 
Association 
 - 
Art.60 Income of 
Association 
 - Art.99 Income of the 
Association 
Art.61 Conditions of 
Assistance  to 
Associations 
Art.10 Assistance and 
Cooperation 
 - 
Art.62 Statutory Books 
and Records 
Art.11 Procedure 
applicable in 
Income and 
Expenditure 
 - 
Art.63 Procedure 
applicable in 
Income and 
Expenditure 
Art.11 Procedure 
applicable in 
Income and 
Expenditure, and 
statutory books of 
the association 
 
 - 
Former Associations Law 
No: 2908 
New Associations Law 
No: 5253 
Civil Code 
No: 4721 
Art.64 Acquisition of 
immovable 
property 
Art.22 Acquisition of 
immovable 
property 
 
  
Art.65 Associations’ 
Names that are 
subject to 
Permission 
Art.28 Associations’ 
Names 
  
Art.66 Prohibited Places 
for Associations’ 
activities 
 -  - 
Art.67 Authorization of 
the police 
(“Hükümet 
Komiseri”) 
 -  - 
Art.68 Duties and 
authorities of the 
police 
 -  - 
Art.69* Transmission of the 
illegal and by-law 
violating acts to 
office of the 
director of public 
prosecutions 
 -  - 
Art.70 Fee that will be 
given to the police 
 -  - 
Art.71 Special Situations  - Art.100 Reserved 
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provisions 
Art.72 Associations that 
Turkish Citizens 
have founded 
abroad 
 -  - 
Art.73 Unit of Association Art.2 Definitions  - 
Art.74 Judging Procedure Art.18 Trial Procedure  - 
Art.75-
87 
Penalty Clauses 
 
Art.32 Penalty Clauses 
 
 - 
Art.88 Final Clauses  -  - 
Art.89 Establishment Of 
Special Funds by 
Associations 
 
Art.12 Establishment Of 
Special Funds 
 
 - 
Art.90 Opening clubhouse 
(“Local”) 
Art.26 Facilities to be 
founded by the 
associations prior 
to permission   
 
 - 
Art.91 Attributions to the 
Laws for 
Associations  
 
Art.34 Attributions to the 
Laws for 
Associations  
 
  
- 
Art.92 Provisions of this 
Law applicable to 
professional 
institutions and 
chambers  
 
Art.35 Provisions of the 
Law applicable to 
professional 
institutions and 
chambers  
 
 - 
Art.93 Application of 
Turkish Civil Code 
Art.36 Applicable Clauses  - 
Art.94 Regulation 
 
Art.37 Regulation   
* The Articles of the former Associations Law indicated with an (*), because they are 
defined as criminal in the other laws, are not repudiated by the new Associations Law.  
 
Source: Turkey Third Sector Foundation (TESEV), Translated by: Derya Baykal 
 
 
 
 
